Myspace, Yourspace, But Not Theirspace: The Constitutionality of Banning Sex Offenders From Social Networking Sites by Wynton, Jasmine S.
WYNTON IN PRINTER PROOF.DOC 4/14/2011 8:08:24 PM 
 
 
Note 
MYSPACE, YOURSPACE, BUT NOT 
THEIRSPACE: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 
BANNING SEX OFFENDERS FROM SOCIAL  
NETWORKING SITES 
JASMINE S. WYNTON† 
ABSTRACT 
  In recent years there has been intense public pressure to enact 
increasingly restrictive and intrusive sex offender laws. The regulation 
of sex offenders has now moved online, where a growing amount of 
protected expression and activity occurs. The latest trend in sex 
offender policy has been the passage of state laws prohibiting sex 
offenders from visiting social networking sites, such as Myspace or 
Facebook. The use of these websites implicates the First Amendment 
right of expressive association. Broad social-networking-site bans 
threaten the First Amendment expressive association rights of sex 
offenders, who do not lose all of their constitutional rights by virtue of 
their conviction. Although social-networking-site bans are politically 
attractive on the surface, such prohibitions are fundamentally flawed 
because they are predicated on a number of widespread 
misconceptions about sex offenses and sex offender behavior. These 
misconceptions include the beliefs that all registered sex offenders are 
violent sexual predators who have extremely high recidivism rates and 
that Internet predators are increasing the incidence of sex crimes 
against minors. In fact, there is very little evidence to indicate that this 
type of legislation will help reduce sexual violence. This Note argues 
 
Copyright © 2011 by Jasmine S. Wynton. 
 † Duke University School of Law, J.D. expected 2011; Spelman College, B.A. 2008. First, 
I would like to thank God for the ability, strength, and perseverance to write this Note, and I 
would like to thank my family for their constant love, support, and encouragement. I would also 
like to thank Kathryn W. Bradley, John D. Inazu, Guy-Uriel Charles, and Johnson Atkinson for 
their invaluable insights, advice, and comments. Finally, I am grateful to my Note Editor, Chase 
Anderson, as well as Shiveh Reed and the rest of the Duke Law Journal staff, for their 
incredible editorial support. 
WYNTON IN PRINTER PROOF.DOC 4/14/2011  8:08:24 PM 
1860 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 60:1859 
for empirically based and narrowly tailored sex offender policies that 
will strike the appropriate balance between protecting minors from 
sexual abuse and respecting sex offenders’ constitutional rights. Such 
an approach is more likely to help rehabilitate offenders and thus 
protect children and others from sexual predators. 
INTRODUCTION 
The rise in popularity among youth of social networking sites 
such as Twitter, Facebook, and Myspace has increased public concern 
over the dangers that sexual predators pose online. Television 
programs such as Dateline’s To Catch a Predator1 and high-profile 
incidents of Internet-related sex crimes have generated fears that 
minors on such sites are increasingly at “high risk of assault by repeat 
sex offenders.”2 Eager to protect potential victims from online 
predators, legislators have enacted measures to promote child safety 
on the web. These measures include laws regulating minors’ access to 
harmful content online;3 laws requiring sex offenders to register their 
Internet identities;4 and, in the latest wave of legislation, laws 
prohibiting registered sex offenders from using social networking 
sites.5 
Social networking sites have changed the way Americans 
communicate, share ideas, learn information, and organize 
themselves. No longer confined to personal social uses, these sites 
now also serve as accessible platforms for political and social 
organization. Given these expanding uses, courts should consider the 
implications of broad social-networking-site bans on sex offenders’ 
right of expressive association. 
This Note argues that recent legislation banning sex offenders 
from social networking sites impermissibly restricts sex offenders’ 
First Amendment right to freedom of association, and that it 
 
 1. To Catch a Predator (NBC television broadcast). 
 2. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NO EASY ANSWERS: SEX OFFENDER LAWS IN THE U.S. 2 
(2007), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us0907webwcover.pdf. 
 3. See Children’s Internet Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-554, tit. XVII, 114 Stat. 2763A-
335 (2000) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 9134 (2006)) (requiring libraries to install filtering software 
on Internet-access terminals as a condition of federal funding). 
 4. See Keeping the Internet Devoid of Sexual Predators Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-400, 
122 Stat. 4224 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 16915a (Supp. II 2008)) (requiring sex offenders to 
provide all of their Internet identities to the sex offender registry). 
 5. For a discussion of restrictions on sex offenders’ access to the Internet and their use of 
social networking sites, see infra Part I. 
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represents poor public policy. Part I examines federal courts’ 
treatment of computer and Internet bans as a special condition of 
supervised release for sex offenders in child pornography cases.6 It 
also examines the development of state legislation imposing Internet 
and social-networking-site bans. Part II explores how social 
networking sites are changing the contours of the right of expressive 
association and argues that these sites warrant First Amendment 
protection. Part III discusses the constitutional status of sex 
offenders, including offenders on probation or parole and those who 
have completed their sentences. Part IV addresses the constitutional 
issues raised by social-networking-site bans and the policy concerns 
with such bans, highlighting the ways in which these bans are 
inconsistent with the available empirical evidence on sexual violence 
and sex offender behavior. It concludes that these broad social-
networking-site bans are likely unconstitutional as applied to 
offenders who have completed their sentences and that they 
represent poor public policy. 
I.  THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNET AND SOCIAL-NETWORKING-SITE 
BANS IMPOSED ON SEX OFFENDERS 
The practice of imposing Internet restrictions on sex offenders 
originated in the courts. Before states sought to enact legislation 
banning sex offenders from social networking sites, some courts were 
already imposing restrictions on sex offenders’ Internet access as a 
special condition of parole or supervised release.7 These judicially 
imposed bans were broader than social-networking-site bans, usually 
prohibiting the offender from accessing computers or the Internet 
altogether. The first state legislative enactments in this area reflected 
some of the various judicial approaches to computer and Internet 
bans for sex offenders. But, more recently, states have begun 
 
 6. State courts have had less occasion to consider Internet and computer bans than have 
the federal circuit courts. For this reason, discussion of courts addressing such restrictions will 
be limited to federal courts. See Brian W. McKay, Note, Guardrails on the Information 
Superhighway: Supervising Computer Use of the Adjudicated Sex Offender, 106 W. VA. L. REV. 
203, 233 (2003) (discussing the lack of divergence in state courts regarding Internet restrictions). 
 7. See Emily Brant, Comment, Sentencing “Cybersex Offenders”: Individual Offenders 
Require Individualized Conditions When Courts Restrict Their Computer Use and Internet 
Access, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 779, 781–83 (2009) (discussing how federal appellate courts have 
reviewed challenges to computer and Internet restrictions imposed on sex offenders as 
conditions of supervised release and how, recently, “certain states have attempted to take the 
problem into their own hands through legislation”). 
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restricting specific online destinations in addition to imposing 
statutory computer and Internet bans. Although these social-
networking-site bans may be narrower in scope than computer or 
Internet bans, several states have extended their application to all 
registered sex offenders, including those no longer on probation or 
parole. In many cases, the bans apply even when there is no 
connection between the underlying offense and the Internet or a 
social networking site.8 
A.  Internet Restrictions Upheld by Federal Courts as a Special 
Condition of Supervised Release 
The vast majority of cases in which federal courts have 
considered computer and Internet bans have involved charges for the 
possession of child pornography, an increasingly Internet-related 
offense.9 Congress has authorized federal courts to impose special 
conditions—such as Internet restrictions—on offenders placed on a 
term of supervised release after imprisonment.10 Any condition 
imposed on the offender, however, must be “reasonably related” to 
the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and 
characteristics of the defendant, as well as the need to deter future 
criminal conduct, to protect the public, and to rehabilitate the 
 
 8. See infra Part I.B.1. 
 9. See Cheryl A. Krause & Luke A.E. Pazicky, An Un-Standard Condition: Restricting 
Internet Use as a Condition of Supervised Release, 20 FED. SENT’G REP. 201, 202 (2008) (“To 
date, aside from Mitnick, federal appellate courts have not considered Internet restrictions as a 
condition of supervised release in cybercrime cases; however, they have often considered them 
in child pornography cases.” (citing United States v. Mitnick, No. 97-50365, 1998 WL 255343 
(9th Cir. May 14, 1998))). Under the existing federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification 
Act, Pub. L. No. 109-248, §§ 101–155, 120 Stat. 587, 590–611 (2006) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2250 
(2006) and 42 U.S.C. §§ 16,901–16,962 (2006)), also known as the Adam Walsh Child Protection 
and Safety Act, individuals convicted of “production or distribution of child pornography” are 
required to register with local law enforcement as sex offenders. 42 U.S.C. §§ 16911(3)(b)(iii), 
16913 (2006). In some states, a conviction for possession of child pornography can trigger a 
lifelong requirement to register as a sex offender. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.21(4)–(6) 
(West 2010) (requiring sex offenders to register based on certain predicate offenses, including 
possession, production, and promotion of child pornography); see also Deborah Feyerick & 
Sheila Steffen, ‘Sexting’ Lands Teen on Sex Offender List, CNN.COM (Apr. 8, 2009, 10:50 AM 
EDT), http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/04/07/sexting.busts (“In many states, like Florida, if a 
person is convicted of a crime against children [such as possession of child pornography], it 
automatically triggers registration to the sex offender registry.”). 
 10. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) (2006) (delineating special supervised-release conditions courts 
shall and may impose). 
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defendant. The condition must also impose “no greater deprivation of 
liberty than is reasonably necessary” to achieve these purposes.11 
In light of these requirements, federal appellate courts generally 
disfavor unconditional bans on computer and Internet use.12 These 
courts have been especially reluctant to uphold bans when the 
offender was convicted only of possession of child pornography. 
Possession of child pornography and a past history of sexual 
exploitation of minors alone are generally not enough to justify 
unconditional bans;13 rather, the defendant must have engaged in 
conduct online that resulted in direct exploitation of a minor.14 In 
 
 11. Id. The sentencing factors grant judges wide discretion under the Sentencing 
Guidelines to weigh and balance competing considerations in imposing conditions of supervised 
release. Id. § 3553 (2006). 
 12. See, e.g., United States v. Holm, 326 F.3d 872, 878 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[O]ur sister 
circuits . . . have also declined to uphold a total ban on Internet access by defendants convicted 
of receiving child pornography . . . .”). But see Brant, supra note 7, at 785 (explaining the split 
among federal circuits—with some courts supporting a total prohibition, others endorsing a 
more narrow approach, and the rest adamantly opposing such bans—and noting that the most 
common approach utilizes a probation-officer exception); Christopher Wiest, Comment, The 
Netsurfing Split: Restrictions Imposed on Internet and Computer Usage by Those Convicted of a 
Crime Involving a Computer, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 847, 860−61 (2003) (“[A] clear split exists. The 
Seventh, Second, and Third Circuits have upheld the liberal imposition of Internet prohibitions. 
On the other hand, the Eleventh, Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits favor a more restrictive 
approach toward Internet prohibitions.” (footnotes omitted)). 
  This Note argues, however, that the federal appellate courts are not as divided over the 
issue of computer and Internet bans as other authors have contended. A closer look at the 
underlying facts of cases in which appellate courts have considered such restrictions reveals that 
these courts are generally reluctant to impose broad bans on computer and Internet usage and 
have upheld them only in cases with a “sufficient nexus” between the use of the Internet and the 
direct exploitation of children. See, e.g., United States v. Heckman, 592 F.3d 400, 407 (3d Cir. 
2010) (“If [defendant’s ban is] upheld . . . , this would be the first time that we have upheld an 
Internet ban for a conviction involving the transmission of child pornography rather than the 
direct exploitation of children. In fact, considering these factors collectively, [the defendant’s] 
special condition would be the broadest Internet ban upheld by any Circuit Court to date.”); 
United States v. Alvarez, 478 F.3d 864, 867 (8th Cir. 2007) (emphasizing the importance of a 
“sufficient nexus” between the use of the Internet and direct exploitation of children in 
upholding a conditional ban on Internet access). Even in cases in which computer and Internet 
bans have been upheld, the circuit courts have strongly emphasized that such restrictions must 
not infringe a defendant’s Internet use more than necessary and have “admonished sentencing 
judges to tailor Internet conditions narrowly to the end to be served.” Krause & Pazicky, supra 
note 9, at 202. 
 13. See, e.g., United States v. Fields, 324 F.3d 1025, 1027 (8th Cir. 2003) (“Appellate courts 
have overturned conditions seen as overly restrictive, especially in cases involving simple 
possession of child pornography.”). 
 14. See, e.g., United States v. Freeman, 316 F.3d 386, 387 (3d Cir. 2003) (rejecting a ban on 
computer and Internet usage following a conviction for possession of child pornography when 
there was no evidence that the defendant, a previously convicted child molester, used the 
Internet to contact young children). 
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cases lacking this online component, most federal appellate courts 
prefer narrowly tailored conditions—such as requiring installation of 
monitoring and filtering hardware, installation of software that blocks 
access to prohibited websites, or unannounced inspections of the 
offender’s devices by probation officers—as alternatives to absolute 
bans.15 
Conversely, for defendants convicted of “child pornography 
plus”—meaning the offender “engaged in threatening conduct 
beyond mere possession” of child pornography16—federal appellate 
courts have shown a greater willingness to uphold computer and 
Internet bans.17 Conduct that may warrant harsher restrictions on 
computer and Internet use includes directly sexually exploitative 
conduct, such as the use of the Internet to develop an illegal sexual 
relationship with a minor;18 use of the Internet to advise others on 
how to solicit children for illicit purposes;19 sale of subscriptions to 
 
 15. See, e.g., Holm, 326 F.3d at 878−79 (suggesting, as an alternative to a total ban on 
Internet access, “[v]arious forms of monitored Internet use” or other “precise restrictions that 
protect the child-victims used in Internet pornography”); Freeman, 316 F.3d at 392 (reversing a 
ban on the use of computers with Internet access without probation-officer approval and 
suggesting instead “a more focused restriction, limited to pornography sites and images,” 
enforced through unannounced computer inspections). Furthermore, one circuit court has 
suggested that “the Government can check on [defendant’s] Internet usage with a sting 
operation” as an alternative to a broad ban on Internet usage. United States v. Sofsky, 287 F.3d 
122, 126–27 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 16. Krause & Pazicky, supra note 9, at 202. 
 17. See, e.g., United States v. Boston, 494 F.3d 660, 668 (8th Cir. 2007) (“A restriction on 
computer usage does not constitute an abuse of discretion if . . . the defendant used his 
computer to do more than merely possess child pornography, particularly if the prohibition on 
computer usage is not absolute.”); Holm, 326 F.3d at 878 (“We find it notable that this court’s 
concerns . . . are reflected in the decisions of our sister circuits, which have also declined to 
uphold a total ban on Internet access by defendants convicted of receiving child pornography 
without at least some evidence of the defendant’s own outbound use of the Internet to initiate 
and facilitate victimization of children.”); Fields, 324 F.3d at 1027 (“In cases where defendants 
used computers or the internet to commit crimes involving greater exploitation, such [broad] 
restrictions have been upheld.”); see also Krause & Pazicky, supra note 9, at 202 (noting that 
courts “have been more willing to affirm broad bans” when the defendant’s conduct was more 
egregious than simple possession of child pornography). 
 18. See, e.g., United States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122, 125–28 (3d Cir. 1999) (upholding an 
Internet ban against a defendant who used the Internet to meet a fourteen-year-old female with 
whom he engaged in sexual relations and of whom he took sexually explicit photographs, 
including one depicting the two of them engaging in sexual activity). 
 19. See United States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155, 169 (5th Cir. 2001) (upholding a three-year ban 
on computer and Internet use against a defendant who possessed child pornography on his 
computer and advised other consumers of child pornography on how to find “young friends”). 
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websites featuring child pornography;20 or use of online child 
pornography to groom children for sexual relationships.21 Even in 
these cases, however, courts remain hesitant to uphold absolute 
bans.22 Instead, courts have held that bans should contain exceptions 
that allow the offender some legitimate uses of computers and the 
Internet. These exceptions include the probation-officer exception, in 
which the offender is banned from computer and Internet use unless 
specifically approved by a probation officer,23 and the employment 
 
 20. See Fields, 324 F.3d at 1027 (upholding conditional computer and Internet restrictions 
against a defendant who operated an online child pornography service). 
 21. See United States v. Alvarez, 478 F.3d 864, 867–68 (8th Cir. 2007) (upholding a 
conditional Internet ban against a defendant who admitted that child pornography he accessed 
online played a role in his sexual assault of his two-year-old niece). “Grooming” refers to the 
process by which a child victim is lured into sexual abuse. For instance, child pornography may 
be shown to potential victims in order to normalize and encourage child sexual activities. 
 22. The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have recently upheld lifetime bans on computer or 
Internet access in opinions that are not precedential. See United States v. Fortenberry, 350 F. 
App’x 906, 911 (5th Cir. 2009) (upholding a conditional lifetime ban barring the defendant from 
using the Internet without prior approval from a probation officer); United States v. Dove, 343 
F. App’x 428, 433 (11th Cir. 2009) (upholding a lifetime Internet ban for a convicted sex 
offender who used the Internet to lure someone he thought was a thirteen-year-old girl to 
engage in sexual conduct, even though his contact was actually with an undercover investigator). 
 23. See, e.g., United States v. Rearden, 349 F.3d 608, 620 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that 
conditioning a defendant’s access to the Internet on prior approval from a probation officer 
does not “involve a greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary for the purpose 
because it is not absolute; rather, it allows for approval of appropriate online access by the 
Probation Office”); United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1093 (11th Cir. 2003) (finding that an 
Internet prohibition was “not overly broad in that [the defendant] may still use the Internet for 
valid purposes by obtaining his probation officer’s prior permission”).  
  Some circuits have even struck down conditional bans that allowed use of a computer 
or the Internet only with the approval of a probation officer. See, e.g., United States v. Sofsky, 
287 F.3d 122, 126 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that a conditional ban on Internet access subject to the 
approval of a probation officer was nonetheless “a greater deprivation on [the defendant’s] 
liberty than [was] reasonably necessary”). In fact, such conditions have raised concerns among 
reviewing courts about the discretion afforded to probation officers. See United States v. Scott, 
316 F.3d 733, 736 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Terms should be established by judges ex ante, not probation 
officers acting under broad delegations and subject to loose judicial review ex post . . . . Courts 
should do what they can to eliminate open-ended delegations, which create opportunities for 
arbitrary action—opportunities that are especially worrisome when the subject concerns what 
people may read. Is the probation officer to become a censor who determines that [the 
defendant] may read the New York Times online, but not the version of Ulysses at 
Bibliomania.com? Bureaucrats acting as guardians of morals offend the first amendment as well 
as the ideals behind our commitments to the rule of law.”); United States v. Walser, 275 F.3d 
981, 988 (10th Cir. 2001) (noting that “the vagueness of the special condition leaves open the 
possibility that the probation office might unreasonably prevent [the defendant] from accessing 
one of the central means of information-gathering and communication in our culture today”). 
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exception, in which offenders are allowed to use computers and the 
Internet in the workplace or in an employment search.24 
As some commentators have noted in the context of sex offender 
computer and Internet bans, federal appellate courts are “moving 
toward accepting the internet as a basic freedom that even convicts 
should not be permanently denied.”25 In striking down computer and 
Internet bans in child pornography possession cases, many courts 
have acknowledged that “[c]omputers and Internet access have 
become virtually indispensable in the modern world of 
communications and information gathering.”26 Some courts have 
likened the Internet’s “instant link to information” to “opening a 
book” and its communicative properties to those of a telephone.27 
According to one court, just as a conviction for mail fraud would not 
justify a prohibition on the use of the mails,28 a ban on Internet access 
would not be justified solely because “a computer with Internet 
access offers the possibility of abusive use for illegitimate purposes.”29 
“A total ban on Internet access prevents use of e-mail, an increasingly 
widely used form of communication,” and other legitimate “common-
place computer uses such as ‘do[ing] any research, get[ting] a weather 
forecast, or read[ing] a newspaper online.’”30 Consequently, an 
unconditional Internet ban “renders modern life . . . exceptionally 
difficult.”31 As a result, “a total restriction rarely could be justified.”32 
 
 24. See, e.g., United States v. Peterson, 248 F.3d 79, 81 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that the 
special condition of supervised release imposed by the district court banning the defendant from 
computer and Internet usage contained an exception for “employment purposes as authorized 
by the probation officer”). 
 25. David Kravets, 30-Year Computer Ban for Sex Offender Overturned, WIRED THREAT 
LEVEL (Apr. 2, 2010, 7:14 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/04/computer-ban. 
 26. Peterson, 248 F.3d at 83; see also Zinn, 321 F.3d at 1093 (“[T]he Internet has become an 
important resource for information, communication, commerce, and other legitimate uses.”); 
United States v. White, 244 F.3d 1199, 1206 (10th Cir. 2001) (finding that a special condition 
prohibiting the defendant from possessing a computer with Internet access was overly broad 
and a greater deprivation than necessary, given that it would “bar [defendant] from using a 
computer at a library to do any research, get a weather forecast, or read a newspaper online”). 
 27. White, 244 F.3d at 1207. 
 28. Sofsky, 287 F.3d at 126. 
 29. Peterson, 248 F.3d at 83. 
 30. Sofsky, 287 F.3d at 126 (alteration in original) (quoting White, 244 F.3d at 1206). 
 31. United States v. Holm, 326 F.3d 872, 878 (7th Cir. 2003). Moreover, the court took into 
consideration the defendant’s need to earn a living and to reenter society successfully, noting 
that “the conditions as currently written could affect his future productivity and jeopardize his 
rehabilitation.” Id. 
 32. United States v. Scott, 316 F.3d 733, 737 (7th Cir. 2003). 
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B.  State Social-Networking-Site Bans 
The tailored approach of the federal courts to Internet 
restrictions in child pornography cases indicates a need to fashion 
individualized sentences for sex offenders, because not all sex 
offenders pose the same risks to the public after release. As states 
have begun to legislate in this area, however, many have enacted 
broader legislation restricting sex offenders’ use of computers and the 
Internet. Some states have imposed explicit bans on the use of social 
networking sites by sex offenders. Unlike court-imposed computer 
and Internet bans, some states impose Internet restrictions on sex 
offenders without regard to whether the underlying offenses had any 
connection to computers or the Internet. Some states have enacted 
social-networking-site bans that apply to all registered sex offenders, 
including those who have completed their sentences. Some state laws 
even require courts to impose computer, Internet, or social-
networking-site bans on certain offenders as conditions of probation 
or parole, curbing courts’ discretion to impose narrowly tailored 
restrictions when circumstances warrant a more limited approach. 
1. Broad Bans Applying to Registered Sex Offenders Who Have 
Completed Their Sentences. Some state legislatures have addressed 
the threat of online sexual predators by enacting blanket social-
networking-site bans that apply to all registered sex offenders, 
regardless of the nature of their offenses and whether they have 
completed their sentences, including probation or parole. Thus, in 
these states, offenders who did not use a computer in the commission 
of the underlying offenses are still subject to a ban. North Carolina 
enacted such a statute in 2008, making it a Class I felony for a 
registered sex offender to access a “commercial social networking 
website.”33 The statute does not limit the ban to offenders serving 
 
 33. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-202.5(b) (Supp. 2010). For the purposes of the statute, North 
Carolina defines a “commercial social networking Web site” as an Internet site that: 
1) Is operated by a person who derives revenue from membership fees, advertising, or 
other sources related to the operation of the Web site. 
2) Facilitates the social introduction between two or more persons for the purposes of 
friendship, meeting other persons, or information exchanges. 
3) Allows users to create Web pages or personal profiles that contain information 
such as the name or nickname of the user, photographs placed on the personal Web 
page by the user, other personal information about the user, and links to other 
personal Web pages on the commercial social networking Web site of friends or 
associates of the user that may be accessed by other users or visitors to the Web site. 
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probation or parole, or to those who are under some form of state 
supervision. Moreover, the statute does not restrict the ban to 
particular types of offenders, such as high-risk offenders, or types of 
offenses, like Internet-related sex offenses.34 Rather, North Carolina 
bans all registered sex offenders from accessing all social networking 
sites where the sex offender “knows that the site permits minor 
children to become members or to create or maintain personal Web 
pages.”35 
Some states, including Nebraska, have elected to limit their 
social-networking-site bans to certain registered sex offenders, such 
as those who have committed crimes against children—including 
possession of child pornography.36 Though Nebraska’s ban is limited 
to one class of offenders, it applies to all registered sex offenders in 
that class, including those who have completed probation or parole.37 
The Nebraska ban prohibits more than just sex offender use of social 
networking sites—it bans the use of instant messaging and chatroom 
services as well.38 Indiana has enacted a similar social-networking-site 
ban, limiting its application to registered sex offenders convicted of 
committing a crime against a child or found to be sexually violent 
predators.39 
 
4) Provides users or visitors to the commercial social networking Web site 
mechanisms to communicate with other users, such as a message board, chat room, 
electronic mail, or instant messenger. 
Id. The statute excludes from its reach any website that “[p]rovides only one of the following 
discrete services: photo-sharing, electronic mail, instant messenger, or chat room or message 
board platform,” or “[h]as as its primary purpose the facilitation of commercial transactions 
involving goods or services between its members or visitors.” Id. § 14-202.5(c). 
 34. See id. § 14-202.5(a) (“It is unlawful for a sex offender who is registered in accordance 
with Article 27A of Chapter 14 of the General Statutes to access a commercial social 
networking web site.” (emphasis added)). 
 35. Id. § 14-202.5(a) (2008). 
 36. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-322.05(1)(a)–(j) (2009). Nebraska’s social-networking-site ban, 
along with other provisions of its statute relating to sex offenders’ use of computers and the 
Internet, was recently challenged in federal court. The court found parts of the statute 
unconstitutional as applied to sex offenders no longer on probation or parole, and the judge 
granted a new trial to address the constitutionality of the social-networking-site ban. See Doe v. 
Nebraska, 734 F. Supp. 2d 882, 937 (D. Neb. 2010); see also infra notes 123–26 and 
accompanying text. 
 37. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-322.05(1) (applying the ban to “[a]ny person required to 
register under the Sex Offender Registration Act”). 
 38. Id. (prohibiting registered sex offenders from “knowingly and intentionally” using 
social networking sites, instant messaging services, or chatrooms that minors are allowed to 
use). 
 39. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-4-12(e) (LexisNexis 2009) (banning sex offenders convicted of 
offenses against children from knowingly or intentionally using a social networking site, instant 
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2. State Bans Applying Only to Offenders on Probation or Parole.  
Some social-networking-site bans do not apply to all registered sex 
offenders, but instead apply only to probationers or parolees 
convicted of certain sex offenses. Some states require courts to 
impose social-networking-site bans as a condition of probation or 
parole, rather than allowing courts the flexibility to fashion terms 
specific to the particular offender. For instance, New York mandates 
that for registered sex offenders who have committed an offense 
against a minor, offenders at greatest risk of reoffense, and offenders 
who used the Internet to facilitate commission of a crime, “the court 
shall require, as [a] mandatory condition[] of [probation or 
conditional discharge] that such sentenced offender be prohibited 
from using the internet to access . . . a commercial social networking 
website.”40 
Texas has taken a similar approach, applying its ban to registered 
sex offenders convicted of crimes against children, offenders who 
used a computer in the commission of the offense, and offenders 
assigned the highest risk level.41 If such an offender is released on 
parole or mandatory supervision, the parole panel “shall prohibit the 
releasee from using the Internet to . . . access a commercial social 
networking site.”42 Minnesota has also elected to limit the reach of its 
social-networking-site ban to offenders who pose a higher risk to the 
community—those placed on “intensive supervised release.”43 Such 
offenders are not only prohibited from using social networking sites, 
but they are also banned from using instant-messaging programs or 
chatrooms that allow minors to use their services.44 
 
messaging program, or chatroom that “the offender knows allows a person who is less than 
eighteen (18) years of age to access or use”). If the offender contacts a child or a person he 
believes to be a child online through such services, the offense is a Class D felony. Id. § 35-42-4-
12(e)(2). For the statutory definition of “sexually violent predator,” see IND. CODE ANN. § 35-
38-1-7.5(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2010). 
 40. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.10(4-a)(b) (McKinney Supp. 2011). 
 41. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 508.1861(a)(1)–(3) (West Supp. 2010). 
 42. Id. § 508.1861(b)(2). 
 43. MINN. STAT. § 244.05(6)(c) (2009). 
 44. Id. The Minnesota Commissioner of Corrections has discretion to place offenders on 
intensive supervised release if it will further statutorily prescribed goals or if the inmate was 
convicted of certain offenses. Id. § 244.05(6)(b). All level III predatory offenders are placed on 
intensive supervised release. Id. § 244.05(6)(a). In order to enforce this prohibition, the 
Department of Corrections is authorized to conduct “unannounced searches” of the inmate’s 
“computer or other electronic devices capable of accessing the Internet.” Id. § 244.05(6)(b). 
WYNTON IN PRINTER PROOF.DOC 4/14/2011  8:08:24 PM 
1870 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 60:1859 
II.  HOW SOCIAL NETWORKING SITES ARE REDEFINING 
EXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATION IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
State social-networking-site bans are being imposed during an 
explosion in the popularity of social media. No longer simply sources 
of entertainment or leisure, social networking sites have become vital 
tools for social and political organization and expression, 
transforming how individuals communicate and collaborate. Indeed, 
social media have become a primary way in which individuals exercise 
their First Amendment freedom to associate with groups and causes. 
Thus, courts must consider whether broad social-networking-site bans 
infringe on this freedom of association by excessively burdening the 
ability of all sex offenders—including those who have already paid 
their debt to society—to exercise this right. 
A.  The First Amendment Right of Expressive Association 
The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no 
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right 
of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government 
for a redress of grievances.”45 Although the First Amendment does 
not explicitly enumerate the right to freedom of association, it is well 
established that there is a “right to associate for the purpose of 
engaging in those activities protected by the First Amendment—
speech, assembly, petition for the redress of grievances, and the 
exercise of religion.”46 This right of expressive association protects the 
right of individuals to “associate with others in pursuit of a wide 
variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and 
cultural ends.”47 Even though social networking sites differ from 
traditional offline associations in many respects, the Supreme Court 
 
 45. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 46. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984). 
 47. Id. at 622. The Supreme Court has recognized two distinct rights of freedom of 
association. First, there is a right of intimate association, which is recognized as “a fundamental 
element of liberty protected by the Bill of Rights.” Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of 
Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 545 (1987). Examples of intimate relationships to which the Court has 
extended constitutional protection are “those that attend the creation and sustenance of a 
family,” Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619, such as “marriage, the begetting and bearing of children, child 
rearing and education, and cohabitation with relatives,” Rotary Club, 481 U.S. at 545 (citations 
omitted). Second, there is a right of expressive association, rooted in the First Amendment, 
which is the focus of this Note. For background regarding the constitutional evolution of both 
forms of the right of association, see generally John D. Inazu, The Strange Origins of the 
Constitutional Right of Association, 77 TENN. L. REV. 485 (2010). 
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has defined protected expressive association broadly. Social 
networking sites, which support and complement traditional offline 
associations and facilitate the creation of new associations that might 
not otherwise exist, should come within that definition’s reach. 
To receive First Amendment protection, a group must, as a 
threshold matter, be engaged “in some form of expression, whether it 
be public or private.”48 This right of association extends to the 
individual, not just the group.49 Moreover, as the Court explained in 
Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,50 “[A]ssociations do not have to 
associate for the ‘purpose’ of disseminating a certain message in order 
to be entitled to the protections of the First Amendment. An 
association must merely engage in expressive activity that could be 
impaired in order to be entitled to protection.”51 The right of 
expressive association is “more than the right to attend a meeting; it 
includes the right to express one’s attitudes or philosophies by 
membership in a group or by affiliation with it or by other lawful 
means.”52 
The First Amendment does not protect all association, however. 
In City of Dallas v. Stanglin,53 the Supreme Court declined to 
recognize “a generalized right of ‘social association’ that includes 
chance encounters in dance halls.”54 At issue in Stanglin was whether 
dance hall patrons coming together to engage in recreational dancing 
constituted a protected association.55 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing 
for the majority, observed that “[i]t is possible to find some kernel of 
expression in almost every activity a person undertakes—for 
example, walking down the street or meeting one’s friends at a 
shopping mall—but such a kernel is not sufficient to bring the activity 
 
 48. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000); see also Christian Legal Soc’y 
Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 3010 (2010) 
(Alito, J., dissenting) (“The First Amendment protects the right of ‘“expressive association”’—
that is, ‘the right to associate for the purpose of speaking.’” (quoting Rumsfeld v. Forum for 
Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 68 (2006))). 
 49. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 233 (1977) (“Our decisions establish 
with unmistakable clarity that the freedom of an individual to associate for the purpose of 
advancing beliefs and ideas is protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.” (emphasis 
added)). 
 50. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
 51. Id. at 655. 
 52. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965). 
 53. City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19 (1989). 
 54. Id. at 25. 
 55. Id. 
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within the protection of the First Amendment.”56 Some opportunities 
“might be described as ‘associational’ in common parlance, but they 
simply do not involve the sort of expressive association that the First 
Amendment has been held to protect.”57 
B.  Social Networking Sites as Expressive Associations 
Although the Supreme Court has recognized the Internet’s 
important role in facilitating the dissemination of protected speech,58 
it has not acknowledged the Internet’s role in facilitating expressive 
association to the same extent. Case law illustrates a well-protected 
right of expressive association for traditional, formal associations such 
as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
(NAACP) and the Boy Scouts of America. But freedom-of-
association doctrine has not yet adapted to the Internet age and its 
unconventional emerging associations.59 As an increasing amount of 
expressive activity shifts to online spaces, expressive association 
protections must be extended from traditional associations to the new 
forms of association made possible by social media.60 
Like traditional offline associations, social networking sites 
enable users to create communities for the purpose of expressing 
ideas, sharing information, and communicating with others—
expressive activities that have traditionally been afforded First 
Amendment protection. Accordingly, such sites should qualify as 
protected expressive associations under the Supreme Court’s broad 
definition.  
 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 24. 
 58. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997) (“This dynamic, multifaceted category of 
communication includes not only traditional print and news services, but also audio, video, and 
still images, as well as interactive, real-time dialogue. Through the use of chat rooms, any person 
with a phone line can become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could from 
any soapbox. Through the use of Web pages, mail exploders, and newsgroups, the same 
individual can become a pamphleteer. . . . ‘[T]he content on the Internet is as diverse as human 
thought.’” (quoting ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 842 (E.D. Pa. 1996))). The Supreme 
Court held in Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997), that expression on the Internet, like that in 
print media, receives full First Amendment protection. See id. at 849. 
 59. See Katherine J. Strandburg, Freedom of Association in a Networked World: First 
Amendment Regulation of Relational Surveillance, 49 B.C. L. REV. 741, 748 (2008) (noting that 
freedom-of-association case law has generally been concerned with the rights of “existing, 
formal associations and has not yet been adapted to the networked world”). 
 60. See id. at 785 (discussing emergent organizations that use email and other forms of 
digital communication and examining how relational surveillance implicates First Amendment 
interests). 
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In two recent cases, the Court has acknowledged the increasing 
importance of social networking sites as avenues of expression for 
individuals and associations. In Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Commission,61 the Court explained that while “television ads may be 
the most effective way to convey a political message . . . it may be that 
Internet sources, such as blogs and social networking websites, will 
provide citizens with significant information about political 
candidates and issues.”62 The Court also explained, in Christian Legal 
Society v. Martinez,63 that “the advent of electronic media and social-
networking sites reduces the importance of . . . channels” of 
communication like newsletters, designated bulletin boards, and in-
person networking events.64 
As the Court has indicated, social networking sites are forcing 
the public to reconceptualize the notion of an association.65 Members 
of online social networks can use the websites to “maintain pre-
existing social networks” as well as to “build new networks with 
strangers based on shared interests, political views or activities.”66 On 
many social networking sites, members can create profiles sharing 
personal information and can communicate with other members 
through private messages, less-private “comments,” instant 
 
 61. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
 62. Id. at 913 (citations omitted). 
 63. Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v. 
Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010). 
 64. Id. at 2991. 
 65. See Christi Cassel, Note, Keep Out of MySpace!: Protecting Students from 
Unconstitutional Suspensions and Expulsions, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 643, 669 (2007) (arguing 
that students who participate in online social networking spaces such as Myspace groups 
“deserve full protection to associate freely under the First Amendment”); Jonathan Sabin, 
Note, Every Click You Make: How the Proposed Disclosure of Law Students’ Online Identities 
Violates Their First Amendment Right to Free Association, 17 J.L. & POL’Y 669, 703 (2009) 
(arguing that “blogs and social-networking activity, conducted with online aliases, email and IP 
addresses, are ‘expressive associations’”). Krist Novoselic, bass player in the rock band Nirvana, 
has also argued that social networking is changing the First Amendment rights of assembly and 
political association. Focusing on the 2008 presidential campaign, Novoselic asserted that social 
networking has already changed the terrain of elections, stating that “[President Barack] 
Obama’s campaign reinforced the power of association . . . .” Laila Barakat, Former Nirvana 
Bassist to Visit Sac State, STATE HORNET (Sacramento), Sept. 22, 2010, at A1 (alteration in 
original). 
 66. Minjeong Kim, The Right to Anonymous Association in Cyberspace: US Legal 
Protection for Anonymity in Name, in Face, and in Action, 7 SCRIPTED 51, 52 (2010). 
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messaging, blogging, and photo- or video-sharing capabilities.67 
Further, some sites allow members to exercise “a degree of 
selectivity” by making their profiles accessible only to certain 
individuals or groups.68 Online networks like Facebook even allow 
members to create subgroups within the larger network based on 
shared interests in a particular social or political cause.69 Before 
individuals are allowed to join these subgroups, however, they must 
become members of the larger online community by signing up for 
memberships and creating user profiles.70 
Niche social networking websites that cater to specific groups, 
interests, or topics also resemble traditional associations. Unlike 
social networking sites that accommodate a more general audience, 
niche social networking sites like BlackPlanet and MyChurch target 
specific groups—African Americans and Christian churches that 
follow the Nicene Creed, respectively.71 Because these social 
networking sites center on a certain theme, idea, or ideology, 
becoming a member communicates a certain message to the outside 
world. That message is deserving of protection as a form of expressive 
association.  
The act of joining a particular social network in itself can be an 
expressive associational activity.72 Online social networks have 
enabled people to organize more easily by “lower[ing] the costs of 
 
 67. danah m. boyd & Nicole B. Ellison, Social Network Sites: Definition, History, and 
Scholarship, J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM., Oct. 2007, http://jcmc.indiana.edu/vol13/issue1/
boyd.ellison.html. 
 68. Sabin, supra note 65, at 724. 
 69. See Cassel, supra note 65, at 669 (“Some [Myspace] groups, such as Food Not Bombs 
and Support Same-Sex Marriages!, encourage support of popular social and political issues. 
Others, such as Occult Studies and Anarcho-Communism, offer a forum for people with 
alternative or unpopular views to discuss their ideas and opinions.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 70. See Sabin, supra note 65, at 724 (“Also, like traditional organizations, Facebook has 
formalized membership procedures whereby individuals must create an elaborate user profile in 
order to join a particular network.”). 
 71. See BLACKPLANET, http://www.blackplanet.com (last visited Apr. 5, 2011); 
MYCHURCH, http://www.mychurch.org/info/about.php (last visited Apr. 5, 2011). BlackPlanet 
claims to be the largest African-American website in the world and features “music, jobs, 
forums, chat, photos, dating personals and groups all targeted to the specific interests of the 
black community.” BLACKPLANET, supra. The website MyChurch “hosts private social 
networks for churches” for “their congregations to help their members ‘be church’ online.” 
MYCHURCH, supra. According to the site’s “About Us” page, “[c]hurch members can post 
prayer requests, and share needs and resources on the bulletin board,” and “[p]astors can send 
out announcements and upload their sermons.” Id. 
 72. See Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 882 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“Joining is 
one method of expression.”). 
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collective activity and decreas[ing] the importance of geographical 
proximity.”73 Social networking sites are not merely sources of leisure 
or entertainment; they have become serious tools for political and 
social organizing. Myspace’s “Impact Channel” is an example of how 
these sites actively assist their members in advocating for political and 
social causes. Launched in 2007, the channel served as a virtual town 
square during the 2008 presidential election campaign, housing 
official Myspace profiles of the candidates and providing them with 
platforms from which to communicate directly with voters. The 
profiles, which also featured voter registration, fundraising, and 
volunteering tools,74 formed an online community “designed to 
empower politicians, non-profits, and civic organizations to connect 
with users around the world and engage the Myspace community to 
drive political awareness and promote causes they care about.”75 
In the political context, social media outlets provide new tools 
for organizing and financing campaigns, mobilizing voters and 
volunteers, and finding out where candidates stand on the issues. The 
2008 presidential election demonstrated how social networking sites 
can be used to “fuel[] political association” and can serve as robust 
platforms for grassroots organizing.76 This historic election witnessed 
the emergence of new and creative uses of social media for civic and 
political purposes. Presidential candidates—in particular, President 
Barack Obama77—reached out to younger voters through social 
 
 73. Strandburg, supra note 59, at 750; see also Jay Krasovec, Cyberspace: The Final 
Frontier, for Regulation?, 31 AKRON L. REV. 101, 137 (1997) (“The ease of the Internet 
provides the ability and motivation for people to join a multitude of organizations they may 
have otherwise not. The home computer user simply has to pull-up an organization’s home page 
and begin a dialogue.”). 
 74. Alex Williams, The Future President, on Your Friends List, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2007, 
at I1. 
 75. Myspace Safety for Parents & Educators, MYSPACE, http://www.myspace.com/help/
safety/parents (last visited Apr. 5, 2011). 
 76. Steven Chea, Nirvana Bassist Talks Politics, Social Networking, SACRAMENTO PRESS, 
Sept. 24, 2010, http://www.sacramentopress.com/headline/37767/Nirvana_bassist_talks_politics_
social_networking. According to Novoselic, social media are the “association” of the 21st 
century, and social networks will continue to shape the political future, especially in regard to 
campaign financing. Id. 
 77. President Obama went further than did other candidates in utilizing technology to help 
garner support and to interact with voters. His embrace of social media allowed for effective 
grassroots organizing unmatched by his opponents. In fact, a Los Angeles Times blog post 
dubbed President Obama the “first social media president.” David Sarno, Obama, the First 
Social Media President, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2008, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/technology/
2008/11/obama-the-first.html. During the campaign, Obama’s team posted eighteen hundred 
videos to YouTube, including his memorable speech on race. Id. 
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networking sites78 such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube,79 
engaging youth in the political process in record numbers.80 Realizing 
that social media can lower the barriers to participation in the 
political process by creating new ways to engage audiences in civic 
dialogue, President Obama continues to use social media in his 
presidency; YouTube, for example, features its own White House 
Channel.81 President Obama publishes his weekly video address, 
along with other media, on the White House Channel, and he 
conducts live question-and-answer sessions with members of the 
public through YouTube’s news and politics blog, CitizenTube.82 
Social networking sites have also provided speakers and 
protestors around the world with uniquely visible platforms to reach 
interested fellow citizens in ways that street protests and rallies 
cannot.83 For instance, social media played a significant role in helping 
Iranian dissident groups unite, organize, and voice their concerns to 
the outside world following Iran’s disputed 2009 presidential election. 
To keep protestors from sharing footage of what was happening in 
the streets of Tehran, the Iranian government took steps to limit 
 
 78. See, e.g., SUZANNE SOULE & JENNIFER NAIRNE, CIVIC EDUCATION AND YOUTH 
TURNOUT IN THE 2008 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: DATA FROM ENGAGED CITIZENS, WE THE 
PEOPLE ALUMNI NETWORK 12 (2009), available at http://www.civiced.org/pdfs/research/WPSA
_Soule_Nairne.pdf (“Candidates reached out to [young voters], using technology to meet them 
on their turf to solicit their votes, time and money.”). 
 79. In the words of one commentator, “The Obama team has written the playbook on how 
to use YouTube for political campaigns.” Jose Antonio Vargas, The YouTube Presidency, 
WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 2008, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2008/11/the-youtube-
presidency.html (quoting Steve Grove, YouTube head of news and politics). This “new level of 
online communication” with the public helped “cultivate a sense of community amongst 
supporters.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). 
 80. The 2008 election witnessed the third-largest youth voter turnout in American history. 
Press Release, Ctr. for Info. & Research on Civic Learning & Engagement, New Census Data 
Confirm Increase in Youth Voter Turnout in 2008 Election (Apr. 28, 2009), available at http://
www.civicyouth.org/PopUps/Census_Youth_Voter_2008.pdf. Political analysts have cited this 
large youth turnout as a critical factor in President Obama’s victory over Senator John McCain. 
Melissa Dahl, Youth Vote May Have Been Key in Obama’s Win, MSNBC.COM (Nov. 5, 2008), 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/27525497. 
 81. whitehouse’s Channel, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/user/whitehouse (last 
visited Apr. 5, 2011). 
 82. Michael D. Shear, Obama’s YouTube Question and Answer Session, WASH. POST, Feb. 
1, 2010, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2010/02/obamas-youtube-question-and-an.html. 
 83. Lyrissa Lidsky, Why Governments Use Social Media and Why They Should, 
PRAWFSBLAWG (Sept. 13, 2010, 9:19 AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2010/09/
why-governments-use-social-media-and-why-they-should.html. 
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Internet access and block text-messaging services.84 Iranians quickly 
found “novel ways around the restrictions,” however, by “blogging, 
posting to Facebook and, most visibly, coordinating their protests on 
Twitter.”85 Posting to Twitter did not replace traditional means of 
organizing, but it quickly became an extremely useful tool to win 
international attention. Social media played a similar role in the 
Egyptian revolution in early 2011, helping the revolutionaries to 
organize and garner international attention and support for their 
cause.86 Although decades of despotic rule and repression “were 
kindling for the Egyptian revolution,” social media were “both a 
spark and an accelerant for the movement.”87 Social networking sites 
like Twitter can thus help political movements gain momentum, 
coordinate their efforts, and circumvent security barriers more easily 
than traditional offline associations.88 
Nevertheless, some critics argue that online networks are not 
formal enough to be entitled to constitutional protection or that social 
media platforms are built around weak ties89ties unlike those 
traditionally protected by the First Amendment right of association. 
Recognizing online social networking sites as protected expressive 
associations, however, would not create the same type of concerns as 
would extending constitutional protection to “chance encounters in 
dance halls.”90 Though social networking sites may be used for leisure 
and social purposes, the right of association is not limited to political 
forms of association. The Supreme Court has extended First 
 
 84. See Brad Stone & Noam Cohen, Social Networks Spread Defiance Online, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 16, 2009, at A11. 
 85. Id. 
 86. See Sam Gustin, Social Media Sparked, Accelerated Egypt’s Revolutionary Fire, WIRED 
EPICENTER (Feb. 11, 2011, 2:56 PM), http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2011/02/egypts-revolution 
ary-fire. 
 87. Id. 
 88. See Evgeny Morozov, Iran Elections: A Twitter Revolution?, WASH. POST, June 17, 
2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/discussion/2009/06/17/DI2009061702232.
html (“Twitter is [being] used to publicize protests that are already going on—and bring the 
world’s attention to the acts of violence committed by the regime. Twitter’s open platform and 
excellent ability to quickly spread information in decentralized fashion are perfect for 
this . . . .”). Though critics may argue that platforms such as Twitter are not “particularly helpful 
for planning a revolution,” they acknowledge that “in terms of involving the huge Iranian 
diaspora and everyone else with a grudge against Ahmadinejad, [Twitter was] very successful” 
during the Iranian protests. Id. 
 89. E.g., Malcolm Gladwell, Small Change: Why the Revolution Will Not Be Tweeted, NEW 
YORKER, Oct. 4, 2010, at 42, 45–46. 
 90. City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989). 
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Amendment protection to “forms of ‘association’ that are not 
political in the customary sense but that pertain to the social, legal, 
and economic benefit of the members.”91 Further, social networking 
sites help groups organize to engage in speech or assembly for 
political purposes, which is “the kind of activity to which the First 
Amendment ordinarily offers its strongest protection.”92 Social 
networking sites have also made it easier for individuals to connect 
with others who share similar interests or values. The strength of 
social networking sites is in their simplicity, informality, and 
flexibility. According to Professor Jonathan Zittrain, “The qualities 
that make Twitter seem inane and half-baked are what make it so 
powerful.”93 Because of their accessibility and their ability to 
democratize information and connect people across geographic 
boundaries, social networking sites should be recognized as the 
powerful tools for social and political organization that they are. 
III.  THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF SEX OFFENDERS 
As the role of the Internet has expanded, sex offenders have 
challenged the constitutionality of statutes restricting their ability to 
access the Internet. Most challenges have been brought on the 
grounds that such restrictions are an invalid condition of probation, 
parole, or supervised release because they fail to meet the 
requirements of the relevant sentencing statute. Some offenders have 
challenged conditions on First Amendment grounds as well; however, 
courts have been generally reluctant to address these constitutional 
claims because to do so would require them to consider the differing 
rights of sex offenders.94 Unlike persons who have not been convicted 
 
 91. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965). 
 92. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2732 (2010) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (“‘Our First Amendment decisions have created a rough hierarchy in the 
constitutional protection of speech’ in which ‘[c]ore political speech occupies the highest, most 
protected position.’” (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 422 (1992) (Stevens, J., 
concurring))). 
 93. Stone & Cohen, supra note 84. 
 94. See, e.g., United States v. White, 244 F.3d 1199, 1206 (10th Cir. 2001) (“Although the 
[defendant] also insists the prohibition violates his First Amendment rights, we do not reach this 
question. As discussed, the meaning of the condition itself makes it susceptible to remand, not 
its constitutionality.”); United States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122, 128 (3d Cir. 1999) (dismissing 
defendant’s First Amendment freedom of speech and association challenges to a computer and 
Internet ban without performing a constitutional analysis, on the grounds that the ban met the 
requirements set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3583). Courts have also been reluctant to engage in this 
constitutional review when the defendant is not a sex offender but a convicted computer hacker. 
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of a crime, who enjoy full constitutional rights, probationers and 
parolees have limited constitutional rights during their terms of 
conditional release. It is less clear, however, what kind of 
constitutional rights convicted persons possess once they have 
completed their terms of probation and parole. 
A.  Rights of Offenders on Probation, Parole, or Supervised Release 
Federal and state sentencing statutes authorize courts and parole 
authorities to grant offenders terms of probation, parole, or 
supervised release, which “are all different forms of conditional 
release from prison.”95 Whereas probation is supervision imposed by a 
court as an alternative to imprisonment, parole is a form of 
supervision granted by a parole board following an early release from 
prison.96 Similar to parole is the federal system of supervised release, 
a period of supervision which also follows a period of incarceration.97 
With supervised release, however, the offender’s postconfinement 
monitoring is overseen by the sentencing court, rather than the U.S. 
Parole Commission.98 With the passage of the Sentencing Reform Act 
of 1984 (SRA),99 Congress abolished parole for federal prisoners in 
favor of a system of supervised release, making it the federal 
government’s “preferred means of postconfinement monitoring.”100 
 
See, e.g., United States v. Mitnick, No. 97-50365, 1998 WL 255343, at *1 (9th Cir. May 14, 1998) 
(dismissing defendant’s First Amendment challenge to supervised release conditions restricting 
him from accessing computers, without engaging in significant constitutional analysis). But some 
circuit courts have suggested, at the very least, that some Internet restrictions may 
impermissibly infringe upon the First Amendment rights of sex offenders, noting how 
indispensable the Internet is as a medium of communication and that “a total restriction rarely 
could be justified.” United States v. Scott, 316 F.3d 733, 737 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 95. United States v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1, 7 n.4 (1st Cir. 2007). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U.S. 395, 401 (1991). 
 99. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, ch. II, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 28 U.S.C.). 
 100. Gozlon-Peretz, 498 U.S. at 401. Persons sentenced in federal court for conduct 
occurring before November 1, 1987, the effective date of the SRA, are with some exceptions 
subject to special parole, whereas those who were sentenced in federal court after November 1, 
1987, are subject to supervised release under the SRA. See id. at 398. Although parolees and 
supervised releasees are governed by different rules under federal law, the constitutional status 
of these two groups is essentially identical. Weikert, 504 F.3d at 11 n.9 (“[S]upervised release is 
more closely akin to parole than to probation, and thus any distinction the Court might have 
drawn between parole and probation would not differentiate parole from supervised release.” 
(citations omitted)). As the differences between parolees and supervised releasees are not 
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Most states, however, continue to utilize variations of the parole 
system. 
Though judges and parole boards have broad discretion in 
fashioning special conditions for probation and parole, such 
discretion is limited by sentencing guidelines and other statutes. For 
instance, federal courts imposing conditions on supervised release 
must meet the requirements and limiting factors set out in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553. This provision requires that the conditions be “reasonably 
related” to the statutory goals of deterring future criminal conduct, 
protecting the public, and rehabilitating the defendant, and “involve[] 
no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary” to 
achieve those goals.101 In deciding on the particular condition to 
impose, the court is to consider “the nature and circumstances of the 
offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant.”102 
In determining the validity of a probation or parole condition 
that impinges upon a fundamental right, courts will look to the 
relevant sentencing statute, laws governing the power of the parole 
authority, or general sentencing principles. Most jurisdictions 
embrace some variation of the general rule that conditions of 
probation or parole must be reasonably related to the government’s 
interest in the rehabilitation of the offender and the protection of the 
public.103 
Because challenges to probation or parole conditions are often 
decided on statutory or nonconstitutional grounds, however, the level 
of protection the Constitution affords to probationers and parolees 
has been left substantially unanswered. Unlike ordinary citizens, 
probationers and parolees “do not enjoy ‘the absolute liberty to 
 
relevant to this Note’s analysis, the term “parolee” will be used to refer to offenders under both 
the state parole system and the federal system of supervised release. 
 101. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(1)–(2) (2006). 
 102. Id. § 3553(a)(1). 
 103. See, e.g., United States v. Sines, 303 F.3d 793, 801 (7th Cir. 2002) (“A court may impose 
conditions of supervised release which implicate fundamental rights so long as those conditions 
are reasonably related to the ends of rehabilitation and protection of the public from 
recidivism.”); United States v. Ritter, 118 F.3d 502, 504 (6th Cir. 1997) (“[W]here a condition of 
supervised release is reasonably related to the dual goals of probation, the rehabilitation of the 
defendant and the protection of the public, it must be upheld.” (quoting United States v. 
Bortels, 962 F.2d 558, 560 (6th Cir. 1992))); United States v. Bolinger, 940 F.2d 478, 480 (9th Cir. 
1991) (“The restriction on [defendant’s] association rights is valid if: (1) primarily designed to 
meet the ends of rehabilitation and protection of the public, and (2) reasonably related to such 
ends.”). It would also be helpful if courts imposed an additional requirement that restrictions 
bear a reasonable relationship to the crime for which the offender was convicted or to the 
offender’s potential future criminality. 
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which every citizen is entitled, but only . . . conditional liberty 
properly dependent on observance of special [probation] [and parole] 
restrictions.’”104 The Supreme Court has taken a comparative 
approach to analyzing the level of protection that the Constitution 
affords to persons with diminished rights. There is “a continuum of 
possible punishments ranging from solitary confinement in a 
maximum-security facility to a few hours of mandatory community 
service.”105 On one end of the continuum are prisoners, who receive 
the least amount of constitutional protection.106 Next are supervised 
releasees, followed in descending order by parolees and 
probationers.107 Because federal supervised release is “meted out in 
addition to, not in lieu of, incarceration,”108 it is considered to be a 
stronger punishment than probation, permitting a greater deprivation 
of constitutional rights. 
B.  Rights of Offenders Who Have Completed Their Sentences 
Though the Supreme Court has to some extent articulated the 
constitutional space occupied by offenders who are on probation, 
parole, or supervised release, it has made no similar pronouncement 
regarding the constitutional status of those who have completed their 
sentences.109 Unlike prisoners, these offenders have completed their 
 
 104. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874 (1987) (first alteration in original) (quoting 
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972)). 
 105. Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006) (quoting United States v. Knights, 534 
U.S. 112, 119 (2001)). 
 106. See Griffin, 483 U.S. at 874 n.2 (“We have recently held that prison regulations 
allegedly infringing constitutional rights are themselves constitutional as long as they are 
‘reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.’” (quoting O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 
482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987))). 
 107. See Samson, 547 U.S. at 850 (“[O]n the Court’s continuum of possible punishments, 
parole is the stronger medicine; ergo, parolees enjoy even less of the average citizen’s absolute 
liberty than do probationers.” (quoting United States v. Cardona, 903 F.2d 60, 63 (1st Cir. 
1990))). 
 108. United States v. Reyes, 283 F.3d 446, 461 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Cardona, 903 F.2d at 
63). 
 109. Because courts have upheld laws preventing felons from voting, serving on juries, and 
possessing guns, it is commonly assumed that felons have diminished constitutional rights in 
general. The abrogation of felons’ rights in these areas, however, has been upheld on much 
narrower grounds. For instance, the Supreme Court has upheld laws disenfranchising felons 
based upon the express language of “participation in rebellion, or other crime” in the 
Apportionment Clause in Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment and because it was 
historically viewed as valid to disenfranchise criminals with felony convictions, not because 
felons have limited constitutional rights in general. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54−55 
(1974). Furthermore, the constitutionality of laws categorically excluding felons from exercising 
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terms of imprisonment, so there are no legitimate penological reasons 
to override the exercise of their fundamental rights. And unlike 
probationers and parolees, they are not subject to any supervisory 
control that might otherwise justify an impingement of their 
constitutional freedoms. Yet sex offenders are subject to severe 
regulations, such as residency restrictions, after completing their 
sentences. The Supreme Court has yet to review the constitutionality 
of sex offender laws, beyond registration requirements and 
community notification laws, making the constitutionality of these 
other restrictions unclear.110 
 
Second Amendment rights is arguably unclear after District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 
2783 (2008). At least one court has held that such prohibitions violate state constitutional law 
when applied to nonviolent offenders. See Britt v. State, 681 S.E.2d 320, 322–23 (N.C. 2009) 
(holding that as applied to a nonviolent felon, a state law prohibiting felons from possessing 
firearms violated the North Carolina Constitution). 
 110. Elissa Zlatkovich, Note, The Constitutionality of Sex Offender Residency Restrictions: A 
Takings Analysis, 29 REV. LITIG. 219, 220 (2009). Though many states in recent years have 
enacted residency restrictions banning sex offenders from certain areas offline—such as schools, 
childcare facilities, or other places where children congregate—only one federal court of 
appeals has considered the constitutionality of such restrictions. See Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 
703–04 (8th Cir. 2005) (upholding the constitutionality of an Iowa statute that prohibited 
persons who had committed a criminal sex offense against a minor from residing within 2,000 
feet of a school or childcare facility). Notably, the lower court in Doe v. Miller found that Iowa’s 
residency restriction violated the Fourteenth Amendment right to substantive and procedural 
due process, the Ex Post Facto Clause, and the Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination. Doe v. Miller, 298 F. Supp. 844, 880 (S.D. Iowa 2004). As with Internet 
restrictions, residency restrictions go beyond both the sex offender registration schemes deemed 
constitutional by the Supreme Court and the federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification 
Act, Pub. L. No. 109-248, §§ 101–155, 120 Stat. 587, 590–611 (2006) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2250 
(2006) and 42 U.S.C. §§ 16,901–16,962 (2006)). To date, the Court has only upheld sex offender 
registration laws on two occasions: in Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 
1 (2003), and in Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003), both decided on March 5, 2003. The statutes 
presented in both cases required only that sex offenders register with state or local law 
enforcement and that the resulting information be made publicly available after the offenders’ 
release from prison. See Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 538 U.S. at 4−5 (noting that Connecticut’s 
sex offender registration law requires offenders to “register with the Connecticut Department of 
Public Safety (DPS) upon their release into the community” and that it also “requires DPS to 
compile the information gathered from registrants and publicize it”); Smith, 538 U.S. at 90 
(“The Alaska law, which is our concern in this case, contains two components: a registration 
requirement and a notification system.”). Since these two cases were decided, a number of 
states have added residency restrictions to their sex offender regulatory schemes, which have 
been “challenged on various constitutional grounds, with mixed results for plaintiffs.” 
Zlatkovich, supra, at 220. Some courts have upheld residency restrictions over due process, 
cruel and unusual punishment, and ex post facto challenges. See, e.g., Denson v. State, 600 
S.E.2d 645, 647 (Ga. 2004) (holding that a statute prohibiting convicted sex offenders from 
living within 1,000 feet of a daycare facility was not an unconstitutional ex post facto law as 
applied to a convicted sex offender who already lived within 1,000 feet of a day care facility). 
Other state courts have struck down residency restrictions on due process, equal protection, and 
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Several federal courts reviewing the constitutionality of Internet 
restrictions on sex offenders who are no longer subject to supervision 
have acknowledged the dearth of precedent on the subject. For 
instance, in Doe v. Shurtleff,111 a federal district court held that a Utah 
law requiring registered sex offenders to disclose their Internet 
identifiers to the state violated the First Amendment.112 The court 
noted the state’s failure to “cite any authority . . . supporting the 
proposition that a sex offender who has completed his prison term 
and is not on parole or probation gives up First Amendment rights.”113 
The district court relied on Supreme Court precedent holding that 
“even people in custody have First Amendment rights,” and on the 
Tenth Circuit’s ruling “that a complete, unconditional ban on internet 
access as a condition of supervised release is overly broad and 
impermissible,” even for a repeat sex offender.114 The district court 
further found that the defendant had “not given up his right to 
anonymous Internet speech because of his status as a sex offender.”115 
A similar challenge was brought in Doe v. Marion County116 
against an Indiana law requiring registered sex offenders to submit to 
searches of their personal computer equipment and to consent to the 
 
takings grounds, among others; People v. Leroy, 828 N.E.2d 769, 777 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) 
(holding that the plaintiff sex offender’s right to due process was not violated by a state statute 
prohibiting child sex offenders from living within 500 feet of a school and that the regulation 
was not a cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment). See Mann v. 
Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 653 S.E.2d 740, 760 (Ga. 2007) (holding that a residency restriction was an 
impermissible taking without adequate compensation, as applied to a registered sex offender 
who purchased a home in accordance with the statute but was forced to move out when a 
childcare center later opened within 1,000 feet of his home); Elwell v. Township of Lower, No. 
CPM-L-651-05, 2006 WL 3797974, at *14–15 (N.J. Super. Ct. Dec. 22, 2006) (holding that a local 
residency restriction violated the plaintiff sex offender’s substantive due process rights under 
the New Jersey Constitution because it was overly broad and failed to balance the nature of the 
rights affected and the extreme intrusion on those rights with the public need for the law). 
Arguably, the constitutionality of statutorily mandated residency restrictions is unclear. 
 111. Doe v. Shurtleff, No. 1:08-CV-64 TC, 2008 WL 4427594 (D. Utah Sept. 25, 2008), 
vacated as moot, 2009 WL 2601458 (D. Utah Aug. 20, 2009). 
 112. Id. at *19. The court enjoined enforcement of the section of Utah’s sex offender 
registry statute requiring registration of online identities. Id. at *9. In response, the Utah 
legislature amended its statute to address the constitutional violations, and the court permitted 
its enforcement. See Doe v. Shurtleff, No. 1:08-CV-64 TC, 2009 WL 2601458, at *1 (D. Utah 
Aug. 20, 2009). The Tenth Circuit rejected the defendant’s constitutional challenge to the 
revised statute. Doe v. Shurtleff, 628 F.3d 1217, 1220 (10th Cir. 2010). 
 113. Shurtleff, 2008 WL 4427594, at *19. 
 114. Id. at *19−20. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Doe v. Marion Cnty., 566 F. Supp. 2d 862 (S.D. Ind. 2008). 
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installation of monitoring hardware or software on their devices.117 
The district court ruled that sex offenders who “[h]ave completed 
their sentences and are no longer on parole, probation, or any other 
form of court supervision” were “entitled to full Fourth Amendment 
protection, without the lowered expectation of privacy” that 
supervised releasees have.118 Because the plaintiffs had completed 
their punishments and “returned to society,” they “ha[d] rights under 
the United States Constitution.”119 “A person’s status as a felon who is 
no longer under any form of punitive supervision . . . does not permit 
the government to search his home and belongings without a 
warrant.”120 Accordingly, the court found that the “unprecedented 
new law, however well-intentioned,” violated the plaintiffs’ Fourth 
Amendment rights.121 
Most recently, a federal district court reviewed the 
constitutionality of several amendments to the Nebraska Sex 
Offender Registration Act,122 including one requiring registered sex 
offenders to consent to warrantless searches of their computers and to 
the installation of monitoring hardware or software.123 After noting 
that the requirement was “foreign to the federal Sex Offender 
Registration and Notification Act,” the court ruled that the search 
requirement was unconstitutional as applied to “persons who [were] 
not presently on probation, parole or court-monitored supervision” at 
the time of its enactment.124 The court observed that “cases dealing 
with installing equipment to monitor persons during periods of court 
or parole supervision are not persuasive” because “they either (1) 
involve a judicial determination based on an individualized 
assessment of need or (2) deal with persons who have a lessened 
expectation of privacy because they have not yet been released from 
criminal justice supervision.”125 The court found that the state had 
“cited no case” to support its position that a sex offender “who has 
completed his or her punishment and supervision for a sex crime was 
 
 117. Id. at 865. 
 118. Id. at 865, 879. 
 119. Id. at 866. 
 120. Id. at 883. 
 121. Id. at 866. 
 122. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-4001 to -4014 (2009). 
 123. Doe v. Nebraska, 734 F. Supp. 2d 882, 896–97 (D. Neb. 2010). 
 124. Id. at 897, 900. 
 125. Id. at 902. 
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held to have a weaker claim to Fourth Amendment protection than 
ordinary citizens.”126 
Although the Supreme Court has not yet addressed the 
constitutionality of social-networking-site bans, several federal courts 
have struck down other restrictions on sex offenders’ Internet use.127 
Without precedent or case law to suggest otherwise, federal courts 
seem unwilling to hold that sex offenders who have completed their 
sentences have limited First and Fourth Amendment rights. 
IV.  CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS OF SOCIAL-
NETWORKING-SITE BANS 
A conviction for a sex offense does not completely eradicate an 
individual’s constitutional rights. Social-networking-site bans, 
however, threaten those rights retained by sex offenders. First 
Amendment concerns should lead states to enact more narrowly 
tailored restrictions on the use of social networking sites by sex 
offenders on probation, parole, or supervised release, and to abandon 
such legislation altogether for those offenders who have already 
completed their sentences. Furthermore, broad social-networking-site 
bans will likely be ineffective at reducing sexual violence, as they are 
based on a number of faulty assumptions concerning sex offenders 
and the nature of sexual assault. States should carefully reevaluate 
the myths underlying social-networking-site bans in order to fashion 
more empirically based laws that adequately serve the goals they 
purport to meet. 
 
 126. Id. The Nebraska statute also included a social-networking-site ban; however, the judge 
granted a new trial to address the constitutionality of this ban. Id. at 899 (“Factually, both sides 
have failed to produce a record that would allow me to determine how Neb. Rev. Stat § 28-
322.05 (making it a crime for certain offenders to use social networking sites and instant 
messaging or chat room services that allow a person under 18 to access or use such site or 
service) would actually impact particular Plaintiffs or offenders more generally. Whether the 
challenge is ‘as-applied’ or ‘facial,’ I must understand, as a factual matter, how the statute 
works. . . . [M]y independent research suggests [the statute] may have far reaching (and, 
perhaps, unintended) consequences.”). This is the only case to date involving a challenge to a 
social-networking-site ban, and it is still pending. 
 127. Doe v. Shurtleff, No. 1:08-CV-64 TC, 2008 WL 4427594, at *4 (D. Utah Sept. 25, 2008), 
vacated as moot, 2009 WL 2601458 (D. Utah Aug. 20, 2009). 
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A.  The Constitutionality of Social-Networking-Site Bans Targeting 
Sex Offenders 
Even though some state statutes treat all sex offenders alike, not 
all registered sex offenders have the same legal status. Offenders on 
probation, parole, or supervised release have diminished 
constitutional rights and thus receive less constitutional protection 
than those who are no longer under state supervision. At least some 
courts have afforded traditional constitutional protections to sex 
offenders who have completed their sentences.128 As a result, blanket 
social-networking-site bans should not apply with the same force to 
all registered sex offenders. 
When reviewing the constitutionality of social-networking-site 
bans that apply to all registered sex offenders, courts should apply 
different standards to offenders on probation, parole, or supervised 
release than to those who are not under state supervision. In the 
context of the right to anonymous speech and the right against 
suspicionless searches, courts have applied the same standards to sex 
offenders who have completed their sentences as would apply to 
nonoffenders. It is thus likely that in analyzing whether social-
networking-site bans impermissibly infringe upon the associational 
rights of sex offenders not on probation, parole, or supervised release, 
courts would use the same constitutional standards that apply to 
nonoffenders. 
It is unclear what standards would apply to offenders serving 
terms of probation, parole, or supervised release—all of whom 
possess limited constitutional rights. Unlike restrictions determined at 
sentencing, some social-networking-site bans are automatically 
imposed without an individualized assessment of the offender’s 
likelihood to recidivate or to commit Internet sex crimes. Many of 
these bans are not “designed to prevent conduct similar to that which 
[the offender] had been convicted of,” but rather are restrictions on 
associational freedoms “quite independent of any criminal activity.”129 
Therefore, normally relevant sentencing rules should apply. If courts 
do apply constitutional standards, they will likely use a less stringent 
form of the test, similar to what courts have done when applying the 
 
 128. See supra notes 111–26 and accompanying text. 
 129. Best v. Nurse, No. CV 99-3727(JBW), 1999 WL 1243055, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 
1999). 
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Fourth Amendment totality-of-the-circumstances test to searches and 
seizures of probationers and parolees.130 
1. Sex Offenders Who Have Completed Their Sentences.  State 
regulations that seek to ban all registered sex offenders from 
accessing social networking sites directly infringe on the First 
Amendment right of association. Online social networks should be 
recognized as expressive associations, given that a substantial amount 
of expressive activity occurs on such sites. A complete ban on the use 
of social networking sites would significantly burden sex offenders’ 
ability to engage in that protected expressive activity.131 The 
Constitution affords standard First Amendment protection to 
offenders who are no longer on probation, parole, or supervised 
release.132 While the right of expressive association is not absolute, it 
can only be infringed upon “by regulations adopted to serve 
compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that 
cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of 
associational freedoms.”133 
States have a compelling interest in protecting minors from 
sexual violence. It is questionable, however, whether social-
networking-site bans, broadly applied, pass constitutional muster.134 
 
 130. See, e.g., Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 852 (2006) (“Examining the totality of the 
circumstances pertaining to petitioner’s status as a parolee . . . we conclude that petitioner did 
not have an expectation of privacy that society would recognize as legitimate.”). 
 131. See supra Part III. 
 132. See supra Part III.B. 
 133. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984). The “significantly less restrictive” 
language used in Roberts has been equated with the strict scrutiny standard. John D. Inazu, The 
Unsettling ‘Well-Settled’ Law of Freedom of Association, 43 CONN. L. REV. 149, 176 n.142 
(noting that in Roberts, the Court held that “the state achieved its interest through ‘the least 
restrictive means’” and “that the ‘incidental abridgement’ of protected speech ‘[was] not greater 
than [was] necessary,’” and that in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000), four 
dissenting Justices likened the Roberts test to strict scrutiny (alterations in original) (quoting 
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 626, 628) (citing Boy Scouts of Am., 530 U.S. at 640)). 
 134. In Doe v. Nebraska, 734 F. Supp. 2d 882 (D. Neb. 2010), before ordering a new trial to 
address the constitutionality of a social-networking-site ban on free speech grounds, a federal 
district court judge expressed his concern that the statute “may have far reaching (and, perhaps, 
unintended) consequences.” Id. at 899. The judge attached to the opinion his independent 
research, which illustrated “numerous examples of sites that might plausibly be banned for [sex] 
offenders subject to the criminal provisions” of the law. Id. These included chatrooms on 
Breastcancer.org, DiabetesDaily.com, and CivilWarHome.com; popular instant messaging 
services such as Yahoo! Messenger and Gmail Chat; social networking sites such as Facebook, 
Myspace, and LinkedIn; community language learning sites such as LiveMocha.com; issue 
networking sites such as OneClimate.net; and medical networking support groups such as 
DailyStrength.org. Id. Attachment A, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84621, at *148–54. 
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By banning all use of social networking sites by sex offenders, such 
regulations go “far beyond what [is] necessary to achieve a legitimate 
governmental purpose.”135 Some of the social-networking-site bans 
proscribe a substantial amount of constitutionally protected activity, 
as they arguably prevent sex offenders from engaging in legitimate 
protected expression not only on social networking sites136 but also on 
other websites with social networking capabilities, such as political 
blogs137 or the New York Times website.138 
There are less restrictive ways of serving states’ compelling 
interest than such blanket prohibitions. Although courts have held 
that states cannot constitutionally subject offenders no longer on 
probation or parole to less restrictive alternatives—such as 
unannounced searches of computer equipment or the installation of 
monitoring hardware and software139—states can narrow the 
 
 135. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 489 (1960). 
 136. See Legislative Memo: The Electronic Security and Targeting of Online Predators Act (e-
STOP), N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (2008), http://www.nyclu.org/node/1814 (last visited Apr. 
5, 2011) (“[A] tremendous amount of communication takes places [sic] between adults on social 
networking sites. Many people visit MySpace, for example, to engage in political speech or 
advocacy, or to learn about music performances. However the proposed e-STOP law would 
subject to criminal suspicion and prosecution former [sex] offenders engaged in lawful speech 
that is directed to an adult audience, without any intent that the speech reach minors.”). 
 137. Blogs, short for “web logs,” have become an increasingly popular form of expression 
today. See Jay M. Zitter, First Amendment Protection Afforded to Blogs and Bloggers, 35 A.L.R. 
6th 407, 416 (2008) (noting that “persons [on blogs] . . . may feel freer to criticize over the 
Internet than they would in person or in print” and that many blogs “deal with politics, business, 
and [the like]”). 
 138. Many news websites, such as the New York Times, have blogs or allow members to 
adopt nicknames or usernames, post information which other users can view, leave messages or 
comments, or direct links to other social networking sites. Furthermore, there are other websites 
with social networking capabilities that sex offenders could be banned from using, such as Digg, 
which helps facilitate the sharing of information online. What Is Digg?, DIGG, http://
about.digg.com/about (last visited Apr. 5, 2011) (“We’re here to promote that conversation and 
provide tools for our community to discuss the topics that they’re passionate about.”). Another 
example is LinkedIn, a social networking site on which over ninety million professionals 
exchange information and employment opportunities. LINKEDIN, http://www.linkedin.com (last 
visited Apr. 5, 2011). There are even online social networking and support groups for offenders, 
which may help the rehabilitation process by providing job postings and information on where 
to locate a house, find a meal, or get an identification card. See MYCONSPACE, http://
www.myconspace.org (last visited Apr. 5, 2011) (noting that this is a “website where you access 
information about jobs, put up a resume, find out about civil rights issues and news, [and] post 
information about yourself and your life”). 
 139. See Doe, 734 F. Supp. 2d at 901 (holding a requirement that sex offenders submit to 
searches and monitoring of computer equipment unconstitutional as applied to offenders no 
longer on probation or parole or under court supervision); Doe v. Marion Cnty., 566 F. Supp. 2d 
862, 888 (S.D. Ind. 2008) (holding unconstitutional a law requiring sex offenders no longer 
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application of social-networking-site bans to only those sex offenders 
who used the Internet or social networking sites in the commission of 
their underlying offenses.140 Indeed, some states have taken this more 
narrowly tailored approach.141 Requiring a nexus between the 
prohibited online activity and the offense would prevent unnecessary 
restrictions on the First Amendment rights of the significant group of 
sex offenders who have committed only technical sex offenses and 
who did not use a computer, the Internet, or a social networking site 
in the commission of the underlying sex offense. 
Moreover, states can limit the application of broad social-
networking-site restrictions to forbid only unlawful and unprotected 
expressive activities, such as using social networking sites to 
communicate with or to seek sexual relationships with minors.142 Most 
state regulations banning sex offenders from social networking sites 
make criminal the mere act of accessing the website, even if done with 
the intent of engaging in political speech or advocacy, thereby 
abridging offenders’ freedom to engage in a substantial amount of 
lawful expressive activity.143 The First Amendment should require “a 
more precise restriction” than a total ban on all use of these online 
forums by registered sex offenders.144  
 
under any other kind of court supervision to consent to searches of their computer equipment 
or Internet-capable devices). 
 140. The Supreme Court has held, at least in the traditional free speech context, that 
limiting restrictions to a certain class of people is a permissible way of narrowly tailoring a law 
to promote compelling government interests. Cf. United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., 529 U.S. 
803, 815 (2000) (“Targeted blocking is less restrictive than banning, and the Government cannot 
ban speech if targeted blocking is a feasible and effective means of furthering its compelling 
interests.”). 
 141. See, e.g., TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 508.1861(a)(1)–(3) (West 2009) (applying a social-
networking-site ban to registered sex offenders convicted of crimes against children, offenders 
who used a computer or the Internet in the commission of the offense, and offenders assigned 
the highest numeric risk level of three). 
 142. Cf. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 258 (2002) (holding that the Child 
Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251–2260 (2006), was overly broad and 
violated the First Amendment because it banned not only real child pornography, which is 
unprotected speech, but also sexually explicit images that appeared to depict minors but that 
were produced without using real children, abridging the freedom to engage in a substantial 
amount of lawful speech). 
 143. For instance, a North Carolina statute prohibits all registered sex offenders from 
accessing or using social networking sites, regardless of the purpose behind their use of such 
sites. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 144. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 258. As the Supreme Court stated in response to the 
government’s argument that it was necessary to ban virtual child pornography because 
pedophiles can use it as a means to victimize children, “There are many things innocent in 
themselves, however, such as cartoons, video games, and candy, that might be used for immoral 
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2. Sex Offenders Currently on Probation, Parole, or Supervised 
Release.  As discussed earlier, relevant sentencing rules will likely 
apply when courts are reviewing the constitutionality of social-
networking-site bans as applied to sex offenders who remain under 
state supervision. Under those rules, even if the state action is found 
to have some rehabilitative or deterrent purpose and to promote 
public safety, there is usually a requirement that the conditions 
imposed be reasonably related to such ends.145 For an offender who 
has not used a computer, the Internet, or a social networking site in 
the commission of the sex offense, it is unlikely that a social-
networking-site ban would be reasonably related to the offender’s 
rehabilitation or to the protection of the public from the offender’s 
potential future crimes. Such a ban would not be primarily designed 
to prevent the offender from reengaging in the conduct for which he 
was convicted. 
On the other hand, because sex offenders on probation, parole, 
or supervised release have diminished rights, states may face lower 
constitutional limits on restricting associational freedoms. Although it 
is unclear how much lower the constitutional requirements might be 
for restrictions that are not imposed as part of a sentence, 
probationers and parolees still retain some First Amendment rights. 
Case law suggests that even in the probationer and parolee context, 
there should be some narrow tailoring, and restrictions should be “no 
greater than needed where they infringe on First Amendment 
rights.”146 As several circuit courts have suggested in the context of 
sex offender Internet bans, the state’s interest in protecting children 
from sexual victimization online can be achieved through significantly 
less restrictive means, such as the installation of monitoring and 
filtering software, unannounced searches of the offender’s computer, 
or prohibiting the use of the Internet without probation-officer 
 
purposes, yet we would not expect those to be prohibited because they can be misused.” Id. at 
251. 
 145. See, e.g., Birzon v. King, 469 F.2d 1241, 1243 (2d Cir. 1972) (“[W]hen a convict is 
conditionally released on parole, the Government retains a substantial interest in insuring that 
its rehabilitative goal is not frustrated and that the public is protected from further criminal acts 
by the parolee. Although a parolee should enjoy greater freedom in many respects than a 
prisoner, we see no reason why the Government may not impose restrictions on the rights of the 
parolee that are reasonably and necessarily related to the interests that the Government retains 
after his conditional release.”). 
 146. Best v. Nurse, No. CV 99-3727(JBW), 1999 WL 1243055, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 
1999). 
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approval.147 There is no reason why these less restrictive means would 
not be equally applicable in the context of social-networking-site 
bans. If an offender who used the Internet or a social networking site 
to facilitate the commission of a sex offense poses a significant threat, 
however, a more restrictive ban may be the only means by which the 
state can achieve its compelling interest.148 Only in those cases should 
blanket bans pass constitutional muster. 
B.  Social-Networking-Site Bans Are Based on Widespread Faulty 
Assumptions about Sex Offenders 
Current sex offender laws are predicated upon several 
widespread but faulty assumptions about sexual violence and sex 
offender behavior. Like sex offender registration requirements and 
residency restrictions, social-networking-site bans are another well-
intentioned—but ultimately misguided—approach to sex offender 
management. Broad social-networking-site bans are a flawed means 
of protecting children at risk of sexual assault. While failing to 
provide real protection to children, such measures also thwart the 
successful reintegration of sex offenders into the community, which is 
crucial to prevent recidivism. Rather than continuing to blindly enact 
social-networking-site bans, states should reexamine the public policy 
concerns underlying current sex offender regulation and consider 
whether social-networking-site bans adequately serve their purported 
goals. 
1. Myth: All Registered Sex Offenders Are Violent Sexual 
Predators, Rapists, or Pedophiles.  Perhaps the most erroneous 
assumption underlying American sex offender policy is the belief that 
all registered sex offenders are violent sexual predators, rapists, or 
pedophiles. Unfortunately, the sex offender registration system’s one-
size-fits-all approach has reinforced this notion by requiring the 
registration of both violent sex offenders and those who have 
committed only nonviolent, technical sex offenses—offenses that 
“may have had little or no connection to sex” but that trigger 
registration in that state.149 
 
 147. See supra notes 15, 23 and accompanying text. 
 148. See supra notes 16–21 and accompanying text. 
 149. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 2, at 39. Sex offender registries are intended to 
aid investigations by providing law enforcement with a list of the usual suspects, which can be 
cross-checked whenever a sex crime occurs. Id. at 4. This legislative policy choice reflects the 
questionable assumption that known sex offenders commit most sex crimes. Id. Yet because sex 
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States have made varying policy choices in defining which 
offenses require criminals to register as sex offenders.150 As a result, 
state sex offender registries vary greatly, so that a qualifying sex 
offense in one state may not require registration in the next. Once a 
person is a registered sex offender in one state, however, he is always 
considered a sex offender in any other state.151  
In many states, offenders who have committed nonviolent 
offenses such as prostitution, streaking, or public urination can be 
required to register.152 Furthermore, juvenile sex offenders in most 
states are subject to sex offender regulations, including registration 
requirements, community notification, and residency restrictions.153 
Though some minors’ offenses can be serious, minors are often 
subject to sex offender regulations for nonviolent conduct such as 
statutory rape in a consensual sexual relationship, “playing doctor,” 
or “exposing themselves.”154 Thus, many sex offenders subjected to 
harsh and punitive regulations are not the dangerous sexual predators 
 
offenses are largely underreported, and thus underprosecuted, it is likely that most offenders 
are not known to law enforcement. Id. In the end, registries can have the effect of providing the 
public with a dangerously false sense of security. See id. 
 150. See BRENDA V. SMITH, NIC/WCL PROJECT ON ADDRESSING PRISON RAPE, FIFTY 
STATE SURVEY OF ADULT SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS (2009), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1517369 (listing for each state the offenses 
requiring registration, information maintained in registries, information about community 
notification and websites, limitations on residency and employment, and duration of the 
registration requirement). 
 151. Under the Adam Walsh Act, a sex offender who is required to register in one state and 
who knowingly fails to register or update registration following relocation to another state can 
be imprisoned for up to ten years. 18 U.S.C. § 2250 (2006). 
 152. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 2, at 39−40 (finding that at least five states require 
registration for adult prostitution-related offenses, at least thirteen require it for urinating in 
public (only two states require a child to be present), at least twenty-nine states require 
registration for a teenager who had consensual sex with another teenager, and thirty-two states 
require flashers and streakers to register (only seven states require a child to be present)). 
 153. Id. at 8. 
 154. Id. Many commentators have criticized the policy behind requiring children who are 
convicted of sex crimes to register as sex offenders. Some of the conduct, “while frowned upon, 
does not suggest a danger to the community” and merely “reflects the impulsiveness and 
perhaps difficulty with boundaries that many teenagers experience and that most will outgrow 
with maturity.” Id. Moreover, even though there is “little statistical research on recidivism by 
youth sex offenders, the studies that have been done suggest recidivism rates are quite low.” Id. 
at 9. Currently, the “sending of nude or seminude pictures [by text message], a phenomenon 
known as sexting, is a fast-growing trend among teens.” Feyerick & Steffen, supra note 9. 
Sexting that involves the transmission and receipt of pornographic images of minors is treated as 
child pornography in most states, and conviction of a crime against children automatically 
triggers sex offender registration in many states. Id. Thus, a child may have to register as a sex 
offender for sending naked pictures of himself or herself. 
WYNTON IN PRINTER PROOF.DOC 4/14/2011  8:08:24 PM 
2011] SEX OFFENDERS AND SOCIAL NETWORKS 1893 
whom the public fears. Moreover, the more cluttered state registries 
are with technical sex offenders, the more difficult it can be for law 
enforcement to identify offenders who actually pose a threat to the 
public and thus warrant careful monitoring.155 
2. Myth: Strangers Commit Most Sexual Offenses.  Another 
popular misconception is that most sex offenses are committed by 
strangers. Research consistently shows, however, that an 
overwhelming majority of sex offenses are committed by victims’ 
relatives or acquaintances, regardless of whether the victim is a child 
or an adult.156 According to the Department of Justice (DOJ), only 
13.8 percent of all sexual assault cases reported to law enforcement 
agencies involved offenders who were strangers to their victims.157 
 
 155. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 2, at 9 (“[T]he proliferation of people 
required to register even though their crimes were not serious makes it harder for law 
enforcement to determine which sex offenders warrant careful monitoring.”); id. at 45 
(“Another law enforcement official told Human Rights Watch, ‘The expansion of state sex 
offender registries to include more offenses and longer registration periods has really 
compromised our ability to monitor high-risk sex offenders.’”). 
 156. See, e.g., DAVID FINKELHOR, HEATHER HAMMER & ANDREA J. SEDLAK, SEXUALLY 
ASSAULTED CHILDREN: NATIONAL ESTIMATES AND CHARACTERISTICS 5 (Office of Juvenile 
Justice & Delinquency Prevention, Bulletin No. NCJ 214383, 2008), available at http://www.
ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/214383.pdf (noting that a 1999 study indicated that 10 percent of all 
child sexual assault victims were assaulted by a family member, 64 percent by an acquaintance, 
and 25 percent by a stranger—a category that includes someone the child knew by sight but not 
on a personal basis); LAWRENCE A. GREENFELD, SEX OFFENSES AND OFFENDERS: AN 
ANALYSIS OF DATA ON RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT, 1997, at 4 (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 
Bulletin No. NCJ 163392, 1997), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/SOO.PDF 
(“Three out of four rape/sexual assault victimizations involved offenders . . . with whom the 
victim had a prior relationship as a family member, intimate, or acquaintance.”); PATRICIA 
TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, EXTENT, NATURE, AND 
CONSEQUENCES OF RAPE VICTIMIZATION: FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL VIOLENCE 
AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY 21 (2006), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/210346.pdf 
(“Only 16.7 percent of all female victims and 22.8 percent of all male victims were raped by a 
stranger. In general, female victims tended to be raped by current or former intimates, defined 
in this study as spouses, male and female cohabiting partners, dates, boyfriends, and girlfriends. 
In comparison, male victims tended to be raped by acquaintances, such as friends, teachers, 
coworkers, or neighbors.” (cross-reference omitted)); Shelley Ross Saxer, Banishment of Sex 
Offenders: Liberty, Protectionism, Justice, and Alternatives, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1397, 1403 
(2009) (“More than ninety percent of sex crimes against children are committed by fathers, 
stepfathers, relatives, and acquaintances, rather than by . . . strangers. In fact, the percentage of 
nonstranger molestations may be even higher as the majority of this type of sexual abuse is not 
reported and/or prosecuted.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 157. HOWARD N. SNYDER, SEXUAL ASSAULT OF YOUNG CHILDREN AS REPORTED TO 
LAW ENFORCEMENT: VICTIM, INCIDENT, AND OFFENDER CHARACTERISTICS 10 (Bureau of 
Justice Statistics, Bulletin No. NCJ 182990, 2000), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/
pub/pdf/saycrle.pdf (detailing victim-offender relationship statistics for sexual assault cases). 
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The other 86.2 percent of reported sexual assaults were committed by 
someone known to the victim, such as a family member or 
acquaintance.158 In particular, the DOJ reported that when the victim 
was a child, 34.2 percent of offenders were family members and 58.7 
percent were acquaintances, while only 7 percent were strangers.159 
Despite these statistics, legislators have chosen to focus on the 
threat posed by the predatory-stranger sex offender.160 Legislatures 
that enact bans on sex offender use of computers, the Internet, and 
social networking sites overstate the threat posed by online sexual 
predators “to the neglect of the everyday sexual violence committed 
by known and familiar family, friends and acquaintances”—the “most 
common sexual threats” that victims face.161 This kind of “stranger-
danger” legislation ignores the fact that, even in cyberspace, many 
threats that children face are posed by individuals with whom the 
child has a preexisting relationship.162 
 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. For adult victims, 11.5 percent of sexual assaults were committed by family 
members, 61.1 percent were committed by acquaintances, and 27.3 percent were committed by 
strangers. Id. 
 160. See, e.g., Bill Analysis: Hearing on AB-2208 Before the Assemb. Comm. on 
Appropriations, 2009–2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2010), available at ftp://www.leginfo.ca.gov/
pub/09-10/bill/asm/ab_2201-2250/ab_2208_cfa_20100511_154020_asm_comm.html (“The author 
contends this bill will provide additional protection from known sex offenders. As the Internet 
becomes today’s playground, social networking websites are increasingly being utilized by 
children and youth. There must be clear restrictions on sex offenders’ access to these websites to 
protect our children on-line.” (quotation marks omitted)). 
 161. Richard Wright, Introduction to SEX OFFENDERS: FAILED POLICIES, NEW DIRECTIONS 
4 (Richard Wright ed., 2009); see also Saxer, supra note 156, at 1403 (“[C]urrent legislation and 
public awareness focusing on the stranger may keep us from addressing solutions that would aid 
the majority of victims.” (footnotes omitted)). Focusing on online victimization—at the expense 
of the more substantial threat of victimization offline—“creates a danger that known risks will 
be obscured, and reduces the likelihood that society will address the factors that lead to known 
risks, and often inadvertently harm youth in unexpected ways.” Andrew Schrock & danah boyd, 
Online Threats to Youth: Solicitation, Harassment, and Problematic Content, in INTERNET 
SAFETY TECHNICAL TASK FORCE, ENHANCING CHILD SAFETY AND ONLINE TECHNOLOGIES 
app. C, at 5 (2008), available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/sites/cyber.law.harvard.edu/files/
ISTTF_Final_Report.pdf. 
 162. JANIS WOLAK, KIMBERLY MITCHELL & DAVID FINKELHOR, NAT’L CTR. FOR 
MISSING & EXPLOITED CHILDREN, ONLINE VICTIMIZATION OF YOUTH: FIVE YEARS LATER 2 
(2006), available at http://www.unh.edu/ccrc/pdf/CV138.pdf (“[F]indings suggest new directions 
are needed for safety and prevention education [online]. . . . For instance the increase in 
unwanted sexual solicitations and harassment from people youth know offline suggests the focus 
should not be simply on the danger from people youth do not know in person.”); see also 
Kimberly J. Mitchell, David Finkelhor & Janis Wolak, The Internet and Family and 
Acquaintance Sexual Abuse, 10 CHILD MALTREATMENT 49, 49 (2005) (“Although the 
stereotype of Internet crimes involves unknown adults meeting juvenile victims online, Internet 
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3. Myth: Sex Offenders Recidivate at a Higher Rate than Any  
Other Criminals.  Sex offenders are subject to more onerous 
regulations after serving their terms of imprisonment, probation, or 
parole than any other group of criminals.163 Policymakers have 
justified this differential treatment on the ground that sex offenders 
are more likely to reoffend than are any other class of criminals.164 
Some federal legislators have described sex offenders’ rates of 
recidivism as “astronomical,” citing rates as high as 90 percent.165 
Many studies indicate, however, that sex offender recidivism rates are 
much lower than policymakers and the public believe. Research 
indicates that sex offenders, as a group, do not suffer from higher 
rates of recidivism than other categories of criminals;166 in fact, studies 
 
use can also play a role in sexual crimes against minors by family members and 
acquaintances.”). 
 163. See Corey Rayburn Yung, The Emerging Criminal War on Sex Offenders, 45 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 435, 447 (2010) (“The degree to which the lower-level governments have 
targeted sex offenders, as distinct from other criminals, is notable.”). Contributing to this 
differential treatment of sex offenders is the common assumption that, as a group, sex offenders 
specialize in only sex crimes. At least one recent study, however, indicates that, as “a group and 
across various measures, sex offenders [have] low levels of specialization and persistence in 
offending in absolute and relative terms.” Terance D. Miethe, Jodi Olson & Ojmarrh Mitchell, 
Specialization and Persistence in the Arrest Histories of Sex Offenders: A Comparative Analysis 
of Alternative Measures and Offense Types, 43 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 204, 204 (2006). 
 164. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Rep. Anthony Weiner, D-N.Y., New Study Shows Sex 
Offenders Living Too Close to Our Kids (Jan. 28, 2007), available at http://www.weiner.
house.gov/news_display.aspx?id=82 (“Unlike other criminals, sex offenders pose a unique 
challenge to law enforcement and communities due to high recidivism rates.”). 
 165. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 2, at 25 n.38 (“[W]e know that more than 40 
percent of convicted sex offenders will repeat their crimes” (quoting Sen. Kay Bailey 
Hutchinson, R-Tex.)); id. (“A study of imprisoned child sex offenders found that 74 percent had 
a previous conviction for another child sex offense.” (quoting Rep. Jim Ramstad, R-Minn.)); id. 
(“There is a ninety percent likelihood of recidivism for sexual crimes against children. Ninety 
percent. That is the standard. That is their record. That is the likelihood. Ninety percent.” 
(quoting then-Rep. Mark Foley, R-Fla.)). Unfortunately, policymakers rarely cite and are rarely 
asked about the source or credibility of such figures. Id. 
 166. Recidivism is generally understood as the commission of a subsequent offense, but 
there are several operational definitions for this term. For instance, “recidivism may occur when 
there is a new arrest, new conviction, or new commitment to custody.” CTR. FOR SEX 
OFFENDER MGMT. (CSOM), RECIDIVISM OF SEX OFFENDERS 2 (2001), available at http://www.
csom.org/pubs/recidsexof.pdf. This explains why studies may have differing outcomes, as each 
criterion measures something different. Using subsequent arrests as the determining criterion 
for “recidivism” often will result in higher recidivism rates, because not every arrest results in a 
conviction. Using subsequent convictions will result in lower recidivism rates, but scholars 
generally place more confidence in this criterion, as it means the offender has been through the 
legal process and was found guilty. Finally, using subsequent incarceration as a criterion can 
yield different results, as there are two ways in which offenders may be sent back to prison. One 
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find that “recidivism rates for sex offenders are lower than for the 
general criminal population.”167 
For example, a 2003 DOJ study of sex offenders released from 
prisons in fifteen states in 1994 found that only 5.3 percent were 
rearrested for a new sex crime within three years of release, and only 
3.5 percent were convicted.168 As compared to non-sex offenders 
released from state prison, “sex offenders had a lower overall rearrest 
rate.”169 The overall rearrest rate of non-sex offenders was 68 percent, 
whereas the rearrest rate of sex offenders—for any type of offense, 
not just sex offenses—was 43 percent.170 A study from the New York 
State Division of Criminal Justice Services also revealed that 
registered sex offenders are more likely to be rearrested for a non-sex 
offense than for a sex offense and that “sex offenders are arrested 
and/or convicted of committing a new sex crime at a lower rate than 
other offenders who commit other new non-sexual crimes.”171 
The sex offender registration regime reflects the misconception 
that offenders who have committed sex crimes in the past will likely 
 
is through the commission of a new offense, and the other is through a technical violation of 
parole, which may not involve a subsequent criminal offense, but rather a violation of a 
condition of release, such as consuming alcohol. Id. Moreover, it is important to distinguish 
whether the new arrest, conviction, or commitment to custody is for a new sex offense or for a 
non-sex offense. See id. at 3 (“For the purpose of their studies, researchers must determine what 
specific behaviors qualify sex offenders as recidivists. They must decide if only sex offenses will 
be considered, or if the commission of any crime is sufficient to be classified as a recidivating 
offense.”). Overall, how one defines “recidivism” is very important. 
 167. CSOM, MYTHS AND FACTS ABOUT SEX OFFENDERS 3 (2000), available at http://www.
csom.org/pubs/mythsfacts.pdf. 
 168. PATRICK A. LANGAN, ERICA L. SCHMITT & MATTHEW R. DUROSE, RECIDIVISM OF 
SEX OFFENDERS RELEASED FROM PRISON IN 1994, at 1−2 (Bureau of Justice Statistics, Bulletin 
No. NCJ 198281, 2003), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/rsorp94.pdf 
(reporting that sex offenders are less likely than non-sex offenders to be rearrested for any 
offense; specifically, within three years of release only 43 percent of sex offenders are rearrested 
as compared to 68 percent of non-sex offenders, and only 5.3 percent of sex offenders are 
rearrested for another sex crime). 
 169. Id. at 2. 
 170. Id. at 14. Compared to other groups of offenders, sex offenders’ rearrest rate was low. 
Robbers’ rearrest rate was 70.2 percent, larcenists’ was 74.6 percent, and burglars’ was 74 
percent. Those convicted of homicide had the lowest rearrest rate, 40.7 percent. Id. 
 171. N.Y. STATE DIV. OF PROB. & CORR. ALTS., RESEARCH BULLETIN: SEX OFFENDER 
POPULATIONS, RECIDIVISM AND ACTUARIAL ASSESSMENT 4 (2007), available at http://www.
dpca.state.ny.us/pdfs/somgmtbulletinmay2007.pdf (emphasis omitted). Of sex offenders 
appearing on the registry, 15 percent were arrested for a new offense within a year, and only 2 
percent were arrested for a new sex offense. Id. at 3. The same report also revealed that for 
individuals convicted of any type of crime, 8.7 percent were rearrested within three years for 
violent felony offenses, 7 percent for felony drug offenses, and 14.8 percent for other felony 
offenses. Id. at 4. 
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do so again. The overemphasis on known sex offenders reinforces the 
erroneous assumption that previously convicted sex offenders are, 
and will continue to be, responsible for most sex crimes. That is a 
dangerous approach to sex-offender policy, given that “[t]he vast 
majority of sex crimes are committed by someone who is not on the 
Sex Offender Registry.”172 According to a 1997 DOJ study, six out of 
seven offenders imprisoned for rape or sexual assault had not 
previously been convicted of a violent sex crime.173 Moreover, a study 
of New York prisoners revealed that during 2005–06, approximately 
94 percent of those arrested for sex offenses had no prior sex-offense 
convictions.174 None of these offenders would have been on the sex 
offender registry.175 As a result, laws promoting Internet safety should 
be designed with the presupposition that most online sexual predators 
are likely not on any sex offender registry. 
 
 172. “Myths and Facts”: Current Research on Managing Sex Offenders, N.Y. STATE DIV. OF 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVS., http://criminaljustice.state.ny.us/nsor/som_mythsandfacts.htm (last 
updated Apr. 2008) (emphasis omitted). 
 173. GREENFELD, supra note 156, at 22. 
 174. “Myths and Facts”: Current Research on Managing Sex Offenders, supra note 172. 
 175. See JUSTICE POLICY INST., REGISTERING HARM: HOW SEX OFFENSE REGISTRIES 
FAIL YOUTH AND COMMUNITIES 13 (2008), available at http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/
upload/08-11_RPT_WalshActRegisteringHarm_JJ-PS.pdf (“As most people who commit sex 
offenses are ‘first-time offenders,’ meaning that they have never been convicted of a sex offense, 
the majority of people committing sex offenses would not already be on the registry.”). 
Furthermore, because “most sex crimes are not reported, and as a result, are not prosecuted,” 
there is an even stronger likelihood that most sex offenders who pose a threat to the public are 
not already known to law enforcement. “Myths and Facts”: Current Research on Managing Sex 
Offenders, supra note 172; see also CSOM, supra note 167, at 2 (“A 1992 study estimated that 
only 12% of rapes were reported. The National Crime Victimization Surveys conducted in 1994, 
1995, and 1998 indicate that only 32% of sexual assaults against persons 12 or older were 
reported to law enforcement. . . . The low rate of reporting leads to the conclusion 
that . . . convicted sex offenders . . . in the United States represent less than 10% of all sex 
offenders living in communities nationwide.” (citations omitted)). As a result, researchers have 
concluded that sex offender registries have limited value in preventing sex crimes. See JUSTICE 
POLICY INST., supra, at 14–15 (“The supposed purpose of the registries is to protect youth and 
adults from potential sexual predators. But evidence shows that most people who experience 
sexual abuse are victimized by people they know, including family members, and thus registries 
do not necessarily make us safer.”). Sex offender registries are only useful to the extent that 
they inform law enforcement authorities and the public of known sex offenders—which cannot 
include offenders who are not on the registry. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 2, 
at 44−45 (quoting a Minnesota law enforcement official, who explained, “[Minnesota’s registry] 
gives us a place to start, but most suspects we arrest are not previously convicted sex offenders. 
Last year, Minnesota had 585 sex offender convictions, and only 58 of those individuals had a 
prior conviction for a sex offense.”); Miethe et al., supra note 163, at 225 (“By narrowing initial 
investigation of sex crimes to registered sex offenders, police agencies may help promote the 
stereotypical image of specialization and thereby inadvertently increase the victimization risks 
from those sexual predators who have remained undetected by the criminal justice system.”). 
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It is similarly erroneous to assume that cordoning sex offenders 
off from society and modern life—offline as well as online—will help 
reduce recidivism. Research shows that this approach to sex offender 
management is counterproductive to the rehabilitation of offenders 
and, as a result, may put society in more danger by aggravating 
factors associated with recidivism. According to researchers, “[T]he 
resulting stigmatization of sex offenders is likely to result in 
disruption of their relationships, loss of or difficulties finding jobs, 
difficulties finding housing, and decreased psychological well-being, 
all factors that could increase their risk of recidivism.”176 Existing sex 
offender policies make it harder for sex offenders to reenter society, 
start new lives, and form new relationships, thus making it more 
difficult for them to “discard their criminal patterns.”177 By placing 
“further obstacles for the [sex] offender to regain stability in his life,” 
such punitive laws exacerbate the risk of recidivism, while at the same 
time instilling a false sense of security in the communities they are 
supposed to protect.178 
4. Myth: Sex Offenders Are Increasingly Targeting Children 
Online.  Contrary to legislators’ claims that convicted sex offenders 
are increasingly targeting children online, studies show decreasing 
percentages of youth are receiving unwanted sexual solicitations on 
the Internet.179 Further, Internet sex crimes against minors have not 
 
 176. Hollida Wakefield, The Vilification of Sex Offenders: Do Laws Targeting Sex Offenders 
Increase Recidivism and Sexual Violence?, 1 J. SEXUAL OFFENDER CIV. COMMITMENT: SCI. & 
L. 141, 141 (2006); see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 2, at 9 (noting that sex offender 
regulations such as residency restrictions can “push former offenders away from the supervision, 
treatment, stability, and supportive networks they may need to build and maintain successful, 
law abiding lives”). 
 177. Wakefield, supra note 176, at 142. 
 178. Amol N. Sinha, Sects’ Offenders: The Inefficacy of Sex Offender Residency Laws and 
Their Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion, 16 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 343, 344−45 
(2010); see also Jill S. Levenson & Leo P. Cotter, The Impact of Sex Offender Residence 
Restrictions: 1,000 Feet from Danger or One Step From Absurd?, 49 INT’L J. OFFENDER 
THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 168, 175 (2005) (finding that residency restrictions may 
increase the types of stressors that can trigger reoffense); Wakefield, supra note 176 (suggesting 
that sex offender registries, notification requirements, and residency restrictions may actually 
make it more likely that sex offenders will reoffend). 
 179. See WOLAK ET AL., supra note 162, at 2 (noting that a second survey revealed a smaller 
proportion of youth who received unwanted sexual advances online, although aggressive 
solicitations did not similarly decline); Janis Wolak, David Finkelhor, Kimberly J. Mitchell & 
Michelle L. Ybarra, Online “Predators” and Their Victims: Myths, Realities and Implications for 
Prevention and Treatment, 63 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 111, 121 (2008) (“Sex crimes against youth 
have not increased. . . . [S]everal sex crime and abuse indicators have shown marked declines 
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surpassed the number of sex crimes committed against minors 
offline.180 One recent study revealed that a “smaller proportion of 
youth Internet users received unwanted sexual solicitations in [2005] 
than in [1999–2000]”; approximately one in seven children surveyed 
received solicitations in 2005, compared to one in five in 2000.181 The 
same study indicated that “[a]cquaintances played a growing role in 
many of the unwanted solicitation incidents.”182 It also found that 
roughly half of the unwanted sexual solicitations came from other 
minors.183 Another study revealed that “Internet sex crimes involving 
adults and juveniles more often fit a model of statutory rape—adult 
offenders who meet, develop relationships with, and openly seduce 
underage teenagers—than a model of forcible sexual assault or 
pedophilic child molesting.”184 Such data may indicate a need for 
different policy approaches, such as focusing more prevention efforts 
on youth who engage in risky online behavior.  
 
during the same period that Internet use has been expanding. From 1990 to 2005, the number of 
sex abuse cases substantiated by child protective authorities declined 51% . . . .” (emphasis 
added)). 
 180. Schrock & boyd, supra note 161, app. C, at 10. 
 181. WOLAK ET AL., supra note 162, at 15. 
 182. Id. at 1 (“In [Youth Internet Safety Survey 2], 14% of solicitations were from offline 
friends and acquaintances compared to only 3% in [Youth Internet Safety Survey 1].”); see also 
Schrock & boyd, supra note 161, app. C, at 10, 15 (“[T]he majority of sexual molestations are 
perpetrated primarily by those the victim knows offline, mainly by family members or 
acquaintances. This appears to be partly true of Internet-initiated sexual offenses as well, as a 
considerable percentage (44%) of Internet sexual offenders known to youth victims were family 
members. . . . [Fifty-six percent] were committed by people known to the victim offline, 
including neighbors, friends’ parents, leaders of youth organizations, and teachers; known cases 
involving strangers are extremely rare.” (citations omitted)). 
 183. See WOLAK ET AL., supra note 162, at 17 (“Those younger than 18 were identified as 
solicitors in a substantial number of incidents—43% of all solicitations and 44% of aggressive 
solicitations.”). Based upon data from Youth Internet Safety Survey 2, conducted in 2005, 43 
percent of unwanted sexual solicitations came from individuals seventeen years of age and 
younger, 30 percent came from persons eighteen to twenty-five years of age, 9 percent from 
people twenty-six years of age and older, and 18 percent were unknown. Id. at 25 tbl.4. 
 184. Id. at 111. In 2000, there were an estimated five hundred arrests by federal, state, and 
local law enforcement for Internet-initiated sex crimes, 95 percent of which were nonforcible. 
Id. at 114–15. This research indicates that efforts to limit the occurrence of Internet sex crimes 
should not be focused only on offenders, but also on educating youth about sexual violence and 
online risk-taking. This may help to reduce the occurrence of Internet-initiated sex crimes. Cf. 
INTERNET SAFETY TECHNICAL TASK FORCE, supra note 161, at 28 (observing that “in most 
incidents of Internet-initiated offline encounters between adults and minors, the minor knows 
that the adult is older (usually in his or her twenties), knows that sex is desired, and believes that 
she or he can consent to a sexual encounter”). 
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Although the threat posed by some sex offenders online is real, it 
is far less substantial than the threat that predators pose offline. In 
addition, focusing on online sexual predators detracts attention from 
other emerging threats that children face on the Internet, such as 
online harassment and bullying.185  
5. Myth: Internet Restrictions Will Help Protect Minors Online.  
Poorly considered laws such as blanket social-networking-site bans 
may prove impractical to enforce. Though some states specify 
methods of enforcement in their statutes—such as the installation of 
monitoring software or periodic, unannounced examinations of the 
offender’s computer or Internet-enabled devices186—a number of 
states do not.187 Even those states that provide for enforcement 
through monitoring technologies may encounter problems because 
“probation officers generally lack the necessary funding for proper 
monitoring equipment and often fail to obtain the technical expertise 
required for adequate training.”188 Moreover, the effectiveness of 
filtering technologies has been questioned as the number of online 
social networks increases, making it “almost impossible for probation 
officers to ensure that these [filtering] programs remain up-to-date.”189 
Although it may be possible to exclude sex offenders from certain 
physical locations through residency restrictions, this exclusionary 
 
 185. INTERNET SAFETY TECHNICAL TASK FORCE, supra note 161, at 4 (“Bullying and 
harassment, most often by peers, are the most frequent threats that minors face, both online and 
offline.”); see also Heather Braegger, Rutgers University Student Tyler Clementi Yet Another 
Victim of Bullying and Harassment, ASSOCIATED CONTENT (Oct. 4, 2010), http://
www.associatedcontent.com/article/5860312/rutgers_university_student_tyler_clementi.html 
(“A college student at Rutgers University jumped to his death in what is yet another suicide that 
can be linked to bullying.”). 
 186. See, e.g., 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-3-7(a)(7.11)(ii)–(iii) (Supp. 2010) (requiring 
offenders to submit to “periodic unannounced examinations of the offender’s computer” or 
Internet-capable device and mandating the installation of hardware or software systems that 
monitor Internet use). 
 187. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-202.5 (Supp. 2010) (failing to provide specific methods 
of enforcement for its social-networking-site ban). 
 188. Brant, supra note 7, at 805 (noting that “the growth of the personal computer and the 
Internet has further complicated busy probation officers’ caseloads with offenders who are often 
more computer savvy than the officers attempting to supervise them”). 
 189. Id.; see also Jane Adele Regina, Comment, Access Denied: Imposing Statutory Penalties 
on Sex Offenders Who Violate Restricted Internet Access as a Condition of Probation, 4 SETON 
HALL CIRCUIT REV. 187, 203 (2007) (“[A]n unwieldy Internet landscape complicated by the 
technological prowess of particular offenders threatens every method of computer surveillance 
with the potential for subversion. . . . [P]robation officers face the impractical task of staying 
abreast of myriad pornographic sites that morph and change on a daily basis in order to 
effectively program the filtering software.”). 
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approach may prove unworkable in cyberspace, especially as more 
website operators incorporate social networking features.190 The 
anonymity afforded by the Internet means that offenders can “merely 
borrow computers or choose different login names” to access 
restricted areas.191 In light of the existing technological limitations, 
these restrictions may not achieve the objectives driving Internet and 
social-networking-site bans. 
CONCLUSION 
Concerns with state social-networking-site bans are twofold: 
First, these bans impermissibly restrict the First Amendment rights of 
sex offenders, who do not lose their constitutional rights just because 
they have committed a sex offense. Second, even if the bans are 
constitutional as applied to certain offenders, they are unlikely to 
keep minors safe online because they are predicated on mistaken 
premises about sexual violence and sex offender behavior. 
Several courts reviewing the constitutionality of Internet-related 
restrictions have acknowledged the dearth of precedent concerning 
the rights of sex offenders, especially those who are no longer on 
probation, parole, or supervised release. In the absence of case law 
suggesting that these offenders have diminished constitutional rights 
as a general matter, courts have found such restrictions 
unconstitutional. In light of these recent cases, it is critical that state 
legislatures strike the right balance between offenders’ liberty 
interests and public safety. Some of these restrictions have failed to 
 
 190. As more websites move toward social networking models, the distinction between a 
non-social networking site and a social networking site has become less clear. For instance, 
many news websites, such as CNN.com or NYTimes.com, have blogs. Thus, members may 
adopt nicknames or usernames; post information that other users can view; and leave messages, 
comments, or direct links to other social networking sites. Will a registered sex offender be able 
to read the New York Times online, or will he be relegated to reading the print version? What 
happens when the New York Times goes out of print? See Jolie O’Dell, New York Times Will 
Go Out of “Print” Sometime in the Future, MASHABLE (Sept. 8, 2010), 
http://mashable.com/2010/09/08/nytimes-print (“At a recent conference, The New York Times’ 
publisher and chairman Arthur Sulzberger, Jr., stated that he eventually expects the ‘Gray 
Lady’ will no longer be a physical newspaper.”). 
 191. Regina, supra note 189, at 199; see also United States v. White, 244 F.3d 1199, 1205 
(10th Cir. 2001) (“Despite the apparent constraint, the [defendant] may visit a library, 
cybercafe, even an airport, and log onto the Internet. The Internet is also accessible via web-t.v. 
by attaching an electronic device to a television. Consequently, if the district court targeted this 
special condition . . . to prevent [the defendant from] using the Internet to order child 
pornography, it missed the mark.”). 
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find the appropriate balance, however, and impermissibly burden sex 
offenders’ rights of association and expression. 
Studies demonstrate that the majority of existing sex offender 
policies are not based on reliable evidence, and they are not sensitive 
to the needs and interests of the victims, the general public, or the 
offenders. Like other existing policies, social-networking-site bans are 
not likely to produce any visible public safety gains or significant 
reductions in offender recidivism. In fact, they may do more harm 
than good by instilling a false sense of security among the public and 
by perpetuating myths about the nature of sexual violence, making it 
more difficult for legislators to craft effective solutions. Rather than 
promulgating popular but highly ineffective laws such as social-
networking-site bans, states should use available research to design 
laws that will serve the ends that they are intended to meet, restricting 
the rights of sex offenders only to the extent necessary to meet these 
ends.192 
This is not to say that all social-networking-site bans are per se 
inappropriate. For some offenders—specifically, those who have used 
the Internet or a social networking site in the commission of the 
underlying sex offense—such bans may be an appropriate condition 
of probation or parole. States considering this type of legislation 
should consider how federal courts have struck a balance between 
protecting the public and rehabilitating the offender on the one hand, 
and protecting the offender’s liberty interests on the other. Federal 
courts have struck this balance by generally opposing unconditional 
Internet bans and by upholding restrictions only when there is a 
sufficient nexus between the underlying conduct and the Internet or 
social-networking-site ban. Given the political unpopularity of sex 
offenders, bans on sex offender Internet use are better left to the 
courts, which can fashion more individualized conditions tailored to 
the specific offense and the specific offender before them. This 
practice would lower the risk that state legislatures will unfairly 
infringe on offenders’ rights through the one-size-fits-all approaches 
that many have taken. Blanket bans from the Internet and social 
networking sites are not the way to protect children from sexual 
 
 192. States considering such legislation should take active steps toward formulating well-
informed sex offender policies based on what is known about sexual violence, sex offenders, and 
strategies that will reduce recidivism and ultimately increase public safety. This can be 
facilitated by hosting public forums or by supporting research institutions and experts in 
conducting research on sex offender treatment and the effectiveness of existing policies. 
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abuse. Unfortunately, the reality is that “[p]eople want a silver bullet 
that will protect their children, [but] there is no silver bullet. There is 
no simple cure to the very complex problem of sexual violence.”193 
 
 193. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 2, at 2 (alteration in original) (quoting Patty 
Wetterling, a child safety advocate whose son was abducted in 1989 and is still missing). 
